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Introduction
1.   We were asked by The Atlantic Philanthropies to conduct an 
evaluation of  public interest litigation in  South Africa to determine, 
primarily, which combination of  strategies has been most effective 
in advancing social change, and the relationship of  litigation to 
other aspects of  social mobilisation.
2.  In order to fulfil this brief, we conducted an extensive evaluation 
of  public interest litigation in South Africa, looking both at recent 
trends in public interest litigation as well the public interest 
litigation conducted prior to the advent of  democracy in South 
Africa.  This included:
 2.1.  considering various helpful materials and information made 
available to us by Gerald Kraak at The Atlantic Philanthropie;
 2.2.  conducting a written survey of  a wide variety of  South African 
public interest litigation organisations;
 2.3.  conducting interviews with a range of  key activists, lawyers 
and judges; and
 2.4.  making use of  secondary sources on public interest litigation 
in South Africa and internationally. 
3.  A list of  the organisations and individuals with which we engaged, 
via the written survey and/or personal interviews, appears as 
Annexure A to this report.  In order to ensure that the views of  
the organisations and individuals concerned could be robustly 
expressed, we undertook that comments made to us in the course 
of  the evaluation would not be attributed to particular respondents. 
We have adhered to that undertaking in this report. 
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4.   We have structured this report into five sections:
Section 1 – Changing trends in the 
South African public interest litigation 
environment
  This section examines the changing trends in the South African 
public interest litigation environment, particularly current 
challenges.
Section 2 – Three Case studies of South 
African public interest litigation
  This section involves a discussion of  three particularly important 
case studies of  recent public interest litigation that provide 
support for many of  the conclusions we reach later in this 
report.  The three case studies are:
 •  The National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality  case 
on the criminalisation of  sodomy and subsequent litigation 
concerning gay and lesbian rights;
 • The Grootboom case on the right to housing; and
 •  The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) case on treatment to 
prevent mother-to-child transmission of  HIV/AIDS.
Section 3 – Four key strategies for social 
mobilisation
  This section deals with strategies that should be used in 
conjunction with public interest litigation for it to achieve 
maximum success in advancing social change.  We identify three 
key strategies to be used:
 •  Conducting public information campaigns to achieve rights 
awareness;
 •  Providing advice and assistance outside litigation to assist 
persons in claiming their rights; and
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 •  Making use of  social mobilisation and advocacy to ensure that 
communities are actively involved in asserting rights inside and 
outside the legal environment.
The fourth strategy, to be used in conjunction with these three, is public 
interest litigation.
Section 4 – Seven factors essential to 
ensuring that public interest litigation 
succeeds and achieves maximum social 
change
This section focusses on the factors that should generally be present 
in order to ensure that public interest litigation succeeds, and achieves 
maximum social change. We have identified seven such factors:
 • Proper organisations of  clients;
 • Overall long-term strategy;
 •  Co-ordination and information sharing;
 •  Timing;
 •  Research;
 •  Characterisation; and
 •  Follow-up.
Section 5 – Summary of findings
A strategic evaluation of public interest litigation in South Africa
7
The poverty of informal settlements compromises the life chances of a generation of children. 
The Constitution enshrines a number of socio-economic rights, such as shelter, food, 
education and health. Since the mid-1990s social movements, NPOs and public interest law 
fi rms have increasingly sought to access these, to counter the worst effects of poverty
Pic: supplied by Legal Resource Centre
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Changing trends in the 
South African public 
interest litigation 
environment
5.  As an important starting point, our evaluation canvassed the evolution 
of  the South African public interest litigation environment.  In this 
regard, respondents were asked to distinguish between three main 
periods:
 5.1. Prior to 1994;
 5.2. Between 1994 and 2000; and
 5.3. After 2000.
THE PERIOD PRIOR TO 1994
6.  In respect of  the period prior to 1994,  respondents emphasised 
that, at least in theory, the mechanisms for public interest litigation 
were very limited.  There was no Bill of  Rights, almost complete 
parliamentary sovereignty, very strict prescription laws that favoured 
the state and a judiciary which often followed the letter of  the law 
even though it may have taken the view that the laws were unjust.  
7.  Nevertheless, and notwithstanding this repressive political climate, 
the South African government displayed a paradoxical attitude to the 
role of  law and the judiciary. Despite its flagrant violation of  human 
rights, the government purported to hold the judiciary in the highest 
esteem and professed respect for the rule of  law. This attitude, 
combined with the government’s attempts to use the law to entrench 
apartheid policy, ironically created opportunities for public interest 
lawyers to exploit gaps in the system. 
8.  Moreover, given the importance of  the issue and the interest of  
the international community and foreign donors, there was a great 
deal of  funding available to engage in public interest litigation. 
Consequently, groups like the Legal Resources Centre and Lawyers for 
Human Rights – as well as various firms – engaged in a great deal of  
successful public interest litigation, focussing primarily on civil and 
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political rights cases.  It was as a result of  this that public interest 
litigation became a critical tool to attack apartheid legislation.
9.  Public interest litigation thus had a substantial advantage, in that it 
had a clear target and focus. Its general purpose was to challenge 
the edifice of  apartheid in its various manifestations.  This allowed 
for carefully focussed and motivated public interest litigation.
THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1994 AND 2000 
10.  Unsurprisingly, a major shift took place in 1994 with the enactment 
of  a supreme Constitution and Bill of  Rights, as well as the creation 
of  a liberal Constitutional Court.  Respondents emphasised the 
following issues in relation to the 1994 to 2000 period.
11.  The coming into force of  the Interim Constitution in 1993, followed 
by the “final” Constitution in 1997, provided a wide array of  
mechanisms and machinery for effective public interest litigation. 
These included extensive fundamental rights – including socio-
economic rights –  as well as generous standing provisions and wide 
remedial powers.  In theory, therefore, this ought to have been the 
high point for public interest litigation, particularly public interest 
litigation leading to social change.  
12.  However, notwithstanding this, and without wishing to discount the 
importance of  a number of  crucial constitutional victories during 
this period – for example the decisions striking down the death 
penalty and the criminalisation of  sodomy – respondents stressed 
that the reality faced by many public interest organisations was one 
of  uncertainty and flux during this period.  
13.  This was partly because there were relatively few lawyers who were 
well versed in the new Constitution and issues arising from it, 
particularly given that law schools had only just begun to teach it to 
their students.  Moreover, because both the Constitutional Court and 
socio-economic rights protection were entirely new, jurisprudence 
on these issues was virtually non-existent.  There was therefore a 
great deal of  uncertainty surrounding the kinds of  cases that should 
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Above:
Justices of the Constitutional Court (2005), from left to right: current Deputy Chief Justice,  
Dikgang Moseneke; Johann van der Westhuizen; Tholie Madala; Sandile Ncgobo; Zac Yacoob 
(standing); Thembile Skewyiye, (standing) Albie Sachs; current Chief Justice, Pius Langa; 
former Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson; Kate O’Regan; Yvonne Mgoro
Below:
The chamber of the Constitutional Court
Pics: Oscar Guiterrez
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be brought to the Constitutional Court, the mechanisms that should 
be used to do so and the likely responses of  the court.
14.  Combined with this was the fact that many of  the persons who had 
been active and developed substantial skills in the public interest 
litigation sphere left the sector during this period, often to work for 
the government in order to assist it in the early days of  democracy. 
Whilst this was unsurprising and indeed was plainly necessary, the 
exodus of  public interest litigators and social activists necessitated 
the development of  a new generation to replace them.  
15.  This, combined with the belief  held by some at least that the new 
government would “do the right thing” and needed to be given the 
space to do so – rather than being antagonised by public interest 
litigation,  meant that much of  the constitutional jurisprudence of  this 
early period focussed on the effects of  the Constitution on criminal 
law rather than on socio-economic rights and social change.  This 
was perhaps reinforced by the caution of  the Constitutional Court 
during these early years – particularly, for example, the caution 
shown in the first case on socio-economic rights – Soobramoney v 
Minister of  Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC).  There, the 
Constitutional Court held that despite life-and-death circumstances 
facing a man unable to obtain dialysis treatment, it could not come 
to the assistance of  the applicant as the government’s policy did 
not violate the right to health care.
16.  Indeed, where public interest litigation went beyond issues of  
criminal law, it often focussed on defending human rights gains 
– for example defending attacks on abortion laws – rather than 
attacking government policies or legislation.
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THE PERIOD AFTER 2000 AND THE CHALLENGES 
OF THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT
17.   The period since 2000 has seen a major shift in the nature of  
public interest litigation.  The litigation in question has tended 
to focus to a far greater degree on socio-economic rights and 
has, in many ways, been ground-breaking.
18.   A question raised by The Atlantic Philanthropies in this 
regard was whether socio-economic rights presently received 
sufficient attention in the South African public interest litigation 
environment.
 18.1.   All respondents agreed that there had been an increase 
(some termed it a “significant” increase) in socio-
economic rights litigation in recent years. Nevertheless, 
virtually all respondents also emphasised that this 
was still insufficient and that there was an inadequate 
focus on socio-economic rights litigation given how 
critical these are to addressing the persistent concerns 
of  poor and marginalised South African people.
 18.2.   The inadequacies identified by the respondents in the 
socio-economic rights litigation that had taken place 
included:
 18.2.1.   A focus on certain socio-economic rights – for example 
housing, health care and land –  to the exclusion of  
others which have not yet been addressed;
 18.2.2.   Inadequate attention being given to considering new 
issues that could have been the subject of  public 
interest litigation; and
 18.2.3.   Insufficient monitoring, awareness-raising and related 
lobbying and advocacy initiatives.
 18.3.   Respondents emphasised that the limited attention on 
socio-economic rights was often due to the inability of  
communities that were the victims of  such violations 
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to access courts and lawyers who could assist them 
in fighting for their rights.  These comments make 
clear that there are insufficient community or other 
non-governmental organisations actively involved 
in dealing with socio-economic rights. We address 
possible solutions to these challenges later in this 
report.
 18.4.   Participants therefore all agreed that the role of  public 
interest litigation organisations in the socio-economic 
rights sphere was critical.  As one respondent 
commented:
     “A lot more needs to be done to strengthen the 
capacity of the existing public interest litigation 
organisations, both to survive and to improve on their 
work.  These organisations are the main avenue for 
poor people to have access to social justice.  Their 
collapse or possible weakening will deprive poor 
people of access to courts and possible entitlements 
that would come with going to courts.”
 18.5.   However, participants also cautioned against too 
strongly seeking to separate one area of  public 
interest litigation from another.  Thus, while it was 
possible to have organisations focussing on children’s 
rights, health rights or gay and lesbian rights, many 
respondents took the view that it was essential that 
general public interest litigation organisations were 
also funded and supported in order to enable them to 
operate across a wide range of  issues.  
 18.6.   This view was expressed even by participants engaged 
in specialised litigation organisations on a narrow 
issue.  One such respondent pointed to the fact that 
the International Commission of  Jurists had tried to 
have a special dedicated fund for “children’s socio-
economic rights” to which any organisation could 
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The Kliptown informal settlement, Soweto, is typical of many in South Africa, though in 
this one, one essential service,  latrines,  has been provided
Pic: Helen Macdonald
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apply for funds.  The respondent commented that in 
practice this did not work very well:
     “It proved difficult to spend the money; organisations 
tried to ‘engineer’ cases, but this was not all that 
successful.  I would not advise that donors should 
allocate funds specifically for socio-economic rights 
as a strategy to make more litigation happen in this 
field.  A better solution is to promote networking 
between NGOs that work on the ground with people 
experiencing socio-economic rights deprivations, 
and litigation organisations.”
 18.7.    We endorse the need for high-quality public interest 
litigation organisations that operate across different 
areas.  As we demonstrate in Section 2 of  this report, 
the examples of  the Grootboom and Treatment Action 
Campaign cases make clear that there is a massive 
overlap between different kinds of  cases.  While 
Grootboom was notionally only about the right to 
housing, it would been far more difficult to succeed in 
TAC had Grootboom not already been decided.
19.   Respondents emphasised three major challenges presently 
facing the South African public interest litigation environment 
in general.  These were:
 19.1.   Lack of  funding;
 19.2.  Lack of  experienced, skilled staff; and
 19.3.   The attitude of  the government.
20.  We address each of  these in turn.
Funding
21.   Virtually all respondents emphasised that the advances in the 
last few years are presently threatened and may be undermined 
by the fact that there has been a substantial decrease in funding 
for public interest work.  As one respondent commented:
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     “With the passage of the new Constitution, many 
international funders assumed that South Africa’s 
human rights problems had been solved and drastically 
reduced their funding of public interest litigation and 
other civil society groups. As a result, many public 
interest litigation organisations have been forced to 
close down some of their regional offices or allow their 
staff attorneys to take on private and corporate cases 
rather than focus exclusively on the public interest.”
22.   Another respondent took a similar view but emphasised the 
massive resources available to the state:
     “The major challenge facing public interest litigation 
groups in South Africa today is a lack of resources, 
especially when compared to those of the state. The 
state is better organised and retains a battery of lawyers, 
whereas many public interest litigation organisations 
are underfunded and thus understaffed. International 
funders have become increasingly disinterested in 
public interest litigation in South Africa, and the 
wealthy in South Africa have yet to become a major 
source of charitable giving.”
23.   Similar sentiments arose in a number of  responses.  However, the 
views expressed – at least in respect of  the resources available 
to the state – need to be carefully qualified, in our view.  Whilst it 
is true that, as a whole, the public interest litigation area might 
be underresourced and underskilled relative to the state, there 
are a core number of  public interest litigation organisations 
that perform extraordinarily well and indeed seem to outdo the 
state consistently.  The Treatment Action Campaign would be 
one obvious example. 
24.   In general terms though, it cannot be doubted that a lack of  
funding is a major issue in respect of  public interest litigation 
in South Africa at present.  This is notwithstanding the sterling 
work done by The Atlantic Philanthropies – mentioned by 
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both grantees and non-grantees surveyed.  As a result of  
this lack of  funding, there are relatively few public interest 
litigation organisations in South Africa at present.  These 
organisations generally tend to be stretched to capacity, with 
little or no capacity to collaborate, or to think long-term and 
strategically.
25.   There are presently moves afoot to resolve this difficulty by 
enlisting the support of  private legal practitioners, via the 
establishment of  ProBono.Org – a public interest clearinghouse. 
However, this valuable initiative is plainly in its very early stages 
and is unlikely to fully resolve the problem of  lack of  resources 
currently facing public interest organisations.
26.  A related issue that The Atlantic Philanthropies asked us to 
evaluate related to whether, if  The Atlantic Philanthropies 
reduced funding to the public interest litigation environment, 
other funders would step in.  In respect of  the organisations 
surveyed that receive funding from The Atlantic Philanthropies, 
it appears that virtually none of  them rely on only The Atlantic 
Philanthropies for funding support. Instead, a variety of  
funders are used.  
27.   Notwithstanding this, all respondents made clear that, if  The 
Atlantic Philanthropies was to reduce its funding of  public 
interest litigation in South Africa, there would almost certainly 
not be other funders that could step into its place, at least not 
satisfactorily.  
28.   Respondents pointed particularly to the fact that other funders 
– for example the Foundation for Human Rights and the Legal 
Aid Board – only funded matters on a case-by-case basis. 
Moreover, the Legal Aid Board funded primarily criminal matters 
and provided only very limited funding for civil litigation. It 
is essential for other funding models to support the public 
interest litigation sector in general and encourage the growth 
and development of  this sector.  
29.   Consequently, the view expressed was that, if  The Atlantic 
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Lawyer Stuart Wilson from the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS), a public interest 
NPO at the University of the Witwatersrand,  consults with tenants facing eviction from 
tenements in the Johannesburg inner city. CALS has successfully used litigation to 
prevent evictions of homeless people
Pic: Jurgen Schadeberg
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Philanthropies was to exit the area, it would create a substantial 
gap.   A number of  respondents emphasised the critical role 
that The Atlantic Philanthropies had played in providing, 
upfront, money for litigation.  They stressed that there was often 
not enough time to fundraise at the time of  intervening in a 
particular case.  Therefore, without a predetermined, allocated 
budget, it would often be impossible for successful interventions 
to take place.
30.   The current funding difficulties facing public interest 
organisations are, in our view, a cause for significant concern. 
Without sufficient funding and support, public interest 
organisations will find it increasingly difficult to enforce rights 
and, all the more so, to do so in a manner which produces 
lasting social change.
31.   This point emerges powerfully from the work of  Charles Epp, 
The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists and Supreme Courts 
in Comparative Perspective (1998).  
 31.1.   Epp studied in detail the growth of  civil rights in four 
jurisdictions: the United States, Britain, India and Canada. 
He concludes that the most significant determinant of  
the development of  the “rights revolution” is the existence 
of  adequately resourced “support structures” for legal 
mobilisation – namely rights-advocacy organisations 
and rights-advocacy lawyers. 
 31.2.   As Epp explains:
     “The basic lesson of this study is that rights are not 
gifts: they are won through concerted collective action 
arising from both a vibrant civil society and public 
subsidy.  Rights revolutions originate in pressure from 
below in civil society, not leadership from above.” (at 
page 197) 
 31.3.   Even more importantly, Epp goes so far as to conclude 
that the existence of  such support structures for legal 
mobilisation is more critical to achieving such a rights 
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revolution than virtually any other factor, including the 
text of  the Constitution and the attitude of  judges:
     “Neither a written Constitution, a rights-supportive 
culture, nor sympathetic judges is sufficient for 
sustained judicial attention to and support for rights. 
Protection of civil liberties and civil rights depends, in 
addition, on a support structure in civil society.  Without 
a support structure, even the clearest constitutional 
rights guarantees are likely to become meaningless in 
the courts; but a vibrant support structure can extend 
and expand the feeblest of rights.  Participants in 
constitutional democracy would do well to focus their 
efforts not only on framing or revising constitutional 
provisions, and not only on selecting the judges who 
interpret them, but also on shaping the support structure 
that defends and develops those rights in practice.” (at 
page 205)
 31.4.   Thus Epp concludes that even though India had an 
“ideal environment” for a rights revolution – including a 
generous Constitution and, at various stages, an activist 
judiciary – the absence of  sufficient support structures 
for legal mobilisation meant that India has not witnessed 
a rights revolution to the extent of  Canada, the United 
States and Britain.   
 31.5.   This is to be contrasted with the example of  Britain, which 
has witnessed such a rights revolution notwithstanding 
it appearing to be an inhospitable environment for such 
a revolution to occur.
32.   Epp’s study constitutes a powerful argument for the continued 
funding and support of  civil society organisations engaged in 
rights advocacy and litigation.  Most critically, if  his approach 
is correct, it suggests that although South Africa now has an 
extremely generous Constitution and many progressive judges, 
this will be insufficient to achieve the fulfilment of  rights unless 
there is proper funding and assistance for support structures.
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September 2007: residents from Khutsong, Gauteng province demonstrate outside the 
Constitutional Court against the government’s re-zoning of their community into the 
much poorer province of North West. The community feared deterioration of the quality of 
municipal services. On the 13 June 2008, the court ruled against them on their petition to 
remain part of Gauteng  
Pic: Antonio Muchave
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33.   The only issue that Epp doesn’t sufficiently interrogate, in 
our view, is precisely what strategies such rights-advocacy 
organisations and rights-advocacy lawyers should use in order 
to achieve lasting social change.  It is to that issue that sections 
3 and 4 of  this report are devoted.
Lack of experienced, skilled staff 
34.   Linked to the problem of  funding and financial resources was 
a second difficulty emphasised by a number of  respondents. 
This was the difficulty in recruiting and retaining quality staff, 
particularly staff  members who understood that public interest 
litigation was not like ordinary lawyering and who therefore had 
more than simply legal skills.  This was substantially, although 
not exclusively, viewed as a problem of  resources with public 
interest organisations being unable to attract or retain sufficient 
persons in light of  competition from private law firms, the 
government and the corporate sector.
35.  As a respondent commented:
  “There is definitely a sense that the international funding 
environment is drying up so publc interest organisations are 
operating with fewer human and financial resources which 
impact on our ability to effectively run cases or run fewer 
cases.”
36.  Another expressed similar views:
  “Skills shortage also plays a major role within these 
organisations. There is a high staff turnover because the best 
brains have either joined government or continue to be poached 
by government and its Chapter 9 institutions.  So sustainability 
within this sector is a major threat to growth in this field.”
37.   Organisations also stressed that there was – in general – a lack 
of  co-operation from the Bar  and that a handful of  practitioners 
carried the vast bulk of  the pro bono work.  
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2007: Para-legal advice offi cers affi liated to the Association of University Legal Aid 
Institutions (AULAI) attend a training workshop to update their knowledge of new legislation
Pic: AULAI
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  “We often have to find counsel willing to act pro bono.  Our 
sense is that you get a better deal from counsel when you are 
able to pay albeit at public interest rates.  In general, one 
wants to avoid a situation where there are only a few dominant 
counsel  that take on pro bono matters because they can afford 
to.  In such an instance these counsel take on less matters and 
only the high profiled matters.  For a human rights culture to 
take root as part of a legal consciousness there should be many 
more ‘human rights cases’ and counsel doing this work.  Socio-
economic rights cases are complex and require research, time 
and strategy; even where public interest litigation organisations 
are well-placed to do this it is essential that funders understand 
this.”
Attitude of the government
38.   Some respondents also raised another obstacle to effective 
public interest litigation – the attitude of  the government. 
39.   In addition to the difficulty of  getting the government to comply 
with court orders, respondents emphasised the apparent 
strategy of  certain government departments to settle matters 
at the last moment, thereby avoiding legal precedents being set 
that would inform future public interest litigation and that would 
allow proper jurisprudence to be built.  
40.   This was of  particular concern to some respondents who felt 
that it could not be taken for granted that South Africa would 
necessarily have judges sympathetic to public interest positions 
beyond the next few years.  As one respondent explained:
  “There is a risk that the courts might, in the future, become less 
open to creative remedies, and might cut back on judgments 
that take strong constitutional rights positions that fly in the 
face of public opinion. I therefore see the next decade as a 
crucial one in laying down precedents that will leave a public 
interest ‘footprint’ in South African jurisprudence.”
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Helen MacDonald and her adopted son Neo: in 2002 the Constitutional Court ruled that gay 
and lesbian couples had the same rights as heterosexuals to adopt children and to start 
families
Pic: Heather Robertson
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Three Case studies of 
public interest litigation
41.   We have considered a large number of  examples of  public interest 
litigation in reaching our conclusions set out in the following 
sections.  We refer to a number of  these cases in due course.
42.   Nevertheless, it appeared to us that a number of  our conclusions are 
demonstrated particularly strongly by three prominent examples 
of  public interest litigation that have taken place in South Africa 
over the past ten years.  The success and failures involved in these 
three examples demonstrate helpfully the basis for and nature of  
our conclusions.
43.   We therefore considered it appropriate to include in this section of  
this report a discussion of  each of  these examples, as case studies 
of  public interest litigation.  Though we touch on the lessons 
provided by each example here, we develop our conclusions in 
more detail in the following sections.
44.  The three case studies we have chosen are:
 44.1.   The National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality 
case on the criminalisation of  sodomy and subsequent 
litigation concerning gay and lesbian rights;
 44.2.  The Grootboom case on the right to housing; and
 44.3.   The Treatment Action Campaign case on treatment to 
prevent mother-to-child transmission (MTCT or PMTCT) 
of  HIV/AIDS.
45.   We consider this choice particularly appropriate given that the 
issue of  the perceived contrast in outcomes for social change 
between the Grootboom case and the TAC merited a specific 
mention in our brief  from The Atlantic Philanthropies.  
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January 2008: Zackie Achmat (right), chair of the Treatment Action Campaign, marries 
partner Dali Weyers at a civil ceremony in Lakeside, Muizenberg. In 2006 the Constitutional 
Court instructed the state to recognise same-sex marriages
Pic: Esa Alexander
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THE NATIONAL COALITION FOR GAY 
AND LESBIAN EQUALITY CASE ON THE 
CRIMINALISATION OF SODOMY AND 
SUBSEQUENT LITIGATION CONCERNING GAY 
AND LESBIAN RIGHTS
46.    Perhaps the most ambitious and extensive public litigation 
programme embarked on by a particular interest group in South 
Africa in the democratic era is that undertaken by gay and lesbian 
groups.  
47.   Initially, the litigation was undertaken by the National Coalition for 
Gay and Lesbian Equality (“the Coalition”), an umbrella body that 
included among its members more than 70 organisations and 
associations representing gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered 
people in South Africa.  Later litigation was undertaken by gay 
and lesbian individuals as well as by successor organisations to 
the Coalition, such as the Gay and Lesbian Equality Project.
48.  The scale of  this litigation has been unparalled.  In the last ten 
years, no fewer than seven separate matters on gay and lesbian 
issues have reached the Constitutional Court on issues ranging 
from adoption to same-sex marriage.  Notably, not only did every 
case result in victory for those seeking to enforce gay and lesbian 
rights, all seven judgments were unanimous on the merits.  The 
single dissenting judgment issued related to what constituted an 
appropriate remedy – not to the merits.
49.   With the benefit of  hindsight, these results may appear obvious 
and  predictable given that Section 9(3) South Africa’s Constitution, 
unlike virtually all other Constitutions, expressly outlaws unfair 
discrimination on the grounds of  “sexual orientation”. However, 
in truth, the successes attained in this area and the now seeming 
inevitability of  the cases can directly be attributed to the 
extraordinarily careful strategy adopted by gay and lesbian groups 
in South Africa.
50.   The starting point, of  course, was persuading the drafters of  the 
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Gay Pride, Johannesburg 2007: the Constitutional Court has conferred full citizenship on the 
country’s gay and lesbian community since the advent of democracy is a series of rulings that 
demolished apartheid-era criminalisation of homosexuality while also conferring new rights 
enshrined in the Constitution adopted in 1995
Pic: Nadine Hutton
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1993 and 1996 Constitutions to include a constitutional prohibition 
on unfair discrimination on grounds of  “sexual orientation”. Such 
inclusion was by no means inevitable, given the lack of  equivalent 
protection in most jurisdictions and the variety of  issues vying for 
attention during the constitutional drafting process.  
51.   The gay and lesbian rights cases make clear that the successes of  the 
litigation in this sector depended substantially on the mobilisation 
and advocacy strategies adopted by gays and lesbians from the 
outset – at the stage of  constitutional development. This included 
political pressure brought to bear by African National Congress 
(ANC) members belonging to or sympathetic to the gay and 
lesbian cause, creating public awareness around gay and lesbian 
issues and a substantial academic discourse on this issue.  These 
strategies meant that when the litigation began, those involved 
did not need to rely on skilful legal argument or litigation strategy 
to persuade the Constitutional Court to locate such rights under 
the rubric of  privacy, liberty or dignity, as in other jurisdictions. 
Rather, the rights were set out in express terms due to the political 
victory that had been achieved.
52.   Following this political victory, in 1998 the first public interest case 
on gay and lesbian issues was brought by the Coalition.  This was the 
case of  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister 
of  Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) in which the Constitutional Court 
confirmed the High Court’s decision to declare unconstitutional 
statutory and common law criminal prohibitions on sodomy.
53.   The fact that the sodomy case was the opening chapter of  South 
Africa’s public interest litigation on gay and lesbian issues was not 
accidental.  
 53.1.   The criminal law prohibiting sodomy was regarded by 
many persons as a great affront to the dignity of  gays 
and lesbians and was plainly a vestige of  apartheid-era 
attitudes toward them.  It was thus a case that would 
manifestly provoke massive support not only in the gay 
and lesbian community, but also among liberal judges 
and liberal members of  the public.  
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2000: The late Minister of Justice Dullar Omar opposed the decriminalisation of sodomy, 
forcing the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality to go to the Constitutional Court. 
The court ruled against the government in 1998
Pic: Luck Morojane
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 53.2.   Moreover, there were clear precedents in foreign 
jurisdictions for court decisions striking down the 
criminalisation of  sodomy – for example Dudgeon 
v United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 149 and Norris v 
Republic of  Ireland (1991) 13 EHRR 186. 
 53.3.   Thus, while it was clear that the case still presented its 
difficulties – difficulties that were added to when the 
Minister of  Justice initially chose to oppose the order 
of  invalidity sought – it was nevertheless the clearest 
gay and lesbian issue on which litigation could take 
place and one that was likely to inspire the members of  
the Constitutional Court to set forth in detail the legal 
position regarding gays and lesbians and the need for 
them not to be unfairly discriminated against. It was for 
these reasons that the Coalition chose this as its first 
case.
54.   The Coalition’s expectations proved entirely justified. In a 
comprehensive and extensive judgment, the Constitutional 
Court unanimously struck down a series of  criminal prohibitions 
contained in statutory and common law regarding the crime of  
sodomy.  Moreover, it did so in ringing tones, condemning the 
manner in which gays and lesbians had been treated in South 
Africa, stressing their consequent vulnerability and the need for 
the law to protect them, and exhorting equal treatment for all 
persons irrespective of  sexual orientation.
55.   One can only imagine how different the situation may have been 
had the first gay and lesbian public interest case concerned, for 
example, same-sex marriage rather than the challenge to the 
criminalisation of  sodomy.
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 55.1.   This was not a remote prospect.  At roughly the same time 
as the sodomy challenge was being launched, a foreign 
gay couple approached a leading South African human 
rights advocate and asked him to represent them in 
challenging the provisions of  the law that prevented gay 
couples from getting married.  The advocate indicated 
his concerns about bringing such a case at that time 
and also doing so on the basis of  the wishes of  a foreign 
couple rather than a South African couple, which may 
have been more attractive to the court.  He duly referred 
the couple to the Coalition.  
 55.2.   The Coalition in turn explained to the couple that it had 
a careful and co-ordinated litigation strategy to achieve 
gay and lesbian equality steadily, but incrementally.  The 
intention was to begin with victories that were easier to 
obtain and leaving more controversial and difficult issues 
such as gay marriage for later.  The Coalition explained 
the danger that a defeat on the marriage case could 
have negative repercussions for a whole range of  other 
gay and lesbian issues.  The foreign couple recognised 
the value of  this approach and, most critically, did not 
seek to undermine or second-guess the legitimacy of  
the Coalition. They therefore opted not to bring their 
application.  
 55.3.   This demonstrates how fundamental it is that public 
interest organisations command sufficient legitimacy 
in the area in which they operate.  Had there been no 
organisation equivalent to the Coalition or had it lacked 
sufficient legitimacy to persuade the couple to withdraw 
their case, the couple may well have proceeded to bring 
the same-sex marriage case at a time when, in our view, 
it may have faced real difficulties. 
 55.4.   Indeed, at that stage, there were virtually no court 
decisions anywhere in the world suggesting that a 
refusal to allow a same-sex marriage violated the right 
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to equality and, while it is possible that the application 
would have succeeded in any event at that stage, the 
issue is open to some considerable doubt.
56.  Instead, the Coalition was able to proceed with its sodomy case 
and obtain the ringing judgment to which we have already referred. 
This led to a series of  later cases brought by the Coalition, or by 
gay and lesbian individuals.
57.   The next case brought by the Coalition was National Coalition for 
Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of  Home Affairs  2000 (2) SA 
1 (CC). 
 57.1.   That case concerned provisions in South African 
immigration laws which only allowed husbands or wives 
of  South African residents to obtain rights to immigrate 
to South Africa. Thus, the legislation excluded same-sex 
life partners of  South African citizens from obtaining 
the same benefits.  
 57.2.   The case was a significant advancement on the sodomy 
case.  It went beyond establishing that gays and lesbians 
could not be criminally condemned for their actions;, 
it was the first step in establishing that same-sex life 
partners ought to be afforded equivalent benefits to 
those granted to married heterosexual couples.  
 57.3.   However, on the back of  the sodomy judgment, the 
case proved relatively straightforward.  Indeed, the 
government of  the day, having opposed the matter in 
the High Court, withdrew a few days before the hearing 
in the Constitutional Court, meaning that there was no 
opposition to the order sought.   
 57.4.   Again, the Constitutional Court had little hesitation in 
unanimously declaring that the law was invalid and, 
crucially for future cases, resolved the statutory difficulty 
itself  by adopting a remedy of  reading in the words “or 
same-sex life partner” into the legislation after the word 
“spouse”. This was to have significant effects in the 
future. 
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58.   In the years after the immigration decision, a series of  three cases 
were brought by gay and lesbian individuals seeking to achieve 
equality in specific areas.   All were successful.
 58.1.   In Satchwell v President of  the Republic of  South 
Africa 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC), a lesbian High Court judge 
challenged the constitutional validity of  statutes and 
regulations which provided that judges’ spouses could 
obtain a series of  pension and other benefits from the 
state and thereby excluded life partners of  gay and 
lesbian judges from these benefits.  The Constitutional 
Court struck down the relevant provisions and read 
in the words “or same-sex life partner” to remedy the 
defect and to provide immediate relief  to affected gays 
and lesbians.  
 58.2.   In Du Toit v Minister of  Welfare and Population 
Development 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC), another lesbian High 
Court judge and her partner successfully challenged the 
statutory prohibition on gay and lesbian couples jointly 
adopting children.  Up to that point, gays and lesbians 
could adopt but only individually, never as a couple. 
Notwithstanding the emotions sometimes raised by the 
issue of  gay adoption, the government did not pursue 
any objection to the case and a unanimous judgment 
was delivered declaring the statute invalid and rectifying 
it in the same way as in the immigration case.  
 58.3.   In J & Another v Director-General, Department of  Home 
Affairs 2003 (5) SA 621 (CC), a lesbian couple undergoing 
artificial insemination challenged legislation that did not 
provide for registration of  persons in permanent same-
sex life partnerships as parents of  children conceived. 
The Constitutional Court unanimously declared the 
legislation unconstitutional and remedied it in the same 
manner as previously. 
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Above:
Judge Kathy Satchwell, left, won an application for her partner, Lesley Carnelley, to receive the same fi nancial 
benefi ts as heterosexual couples. Her victory was part of a progression of court battles that ended in the 
Constitutional Court in March 2005
Pic: Muntu Vilakazi. 3/3/05. © Sunday Times
Below:
Former High Court judge Anna-Marie de Vos (left) and her long-time partner, sculptor Suzanne du Toit, at their 
wedding in George (2007) 
Pic: The Herald
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59.   In light of  all of  these victories, it rapidly became clear that the 
principal issue on which legal finality had not been obtained was the 
question of  gay marriage.  It should be noted that not all members 
of  the gay and lesbian community felt that the achievement of  gay 
marriage was necessarily desirable and certainly not the ultimate 
prize. However, for many people, it represented a vital step.  
60.  Crucially from a litigation strategy perspective, there was a growing 
recognition by Constitutional Court judges – developed over the 
course of  the various decisions and sometimes even manifested 
in comments from the bench – that  a major difficulty arose 
from the state’s failure to deal with gay and lesbian relationships 
holistically or to  allow them the same general benefits as accrued 
to married heterosexual couples. Indeed, the Supreme Court of  
Appeal had gone so far in Du Plessis v Road Accident Fund  2004 
(1) SA 359 (SCA) to develop the common law of  delict by extending 
the spouse’s action for loss of  support to partners in permanent 
same-sex life relationships.
61.   Initially, however, it was not the Coalition or its successor 
organisations that took the first move in challenging the prohibition 
on same-sex marriages.  This was instead done by an individual 
lesbian couple in the case of  Fourie v Minister of  Home Affairs.  
 61.1.   In its original form, that case was not without its 
difficulties.  Indeed it originally failed in the High Court, 
with the judge concluding that the applicants’ case was 
doomed because they had only attacked the common 
law definition of  marriage and omitted also to attack 
the Marriage Act which would, in any event, prevent gays 
and lesbians from getting married.   
 61.2.   Whatever the correctness of  the High Court’s view on 
this issue, its judgment demonstrated the difficulty of  
such a complex case being launched by individuals, 
rather than by an organisation such as the Coalition, 
which had great experience in litigating in these kinds of  
matters and access to the top constitutional lawyers.  
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 61.3.   Nevertheless, on appeal, the case gave rise to a Supreme 
Court of  Appeal judgment in Fourie and Another v 
Minister of  Home Affairs and Others 2005 (3) SA 
429 (SCA) holding that the common law definition of  
marriage which excluded gay and lesbian partners was 
unconstitutional.  
 61.4.   However, while the government may have acquiesced in 
findings of  unconstitutionality in other gay and lesbian 
cases, it was not prepared to let this matter rest.  Instead 
it mounted a substantial appeal to the Constitutional 
Court seeking to have the decision of  the Supreme Court 
of  Appeal overturned.  
 61.5.   However, by that stage, the Gay and Lesbian Equality 
Project, effectively a successor to the Coalition, had 
marshalled its resources and had launched a separate 
application in the High Court seeking to attack the relevant 
provisions of  the Marriage Act.  This timely intervention 
meant that the issue could be dealt with as a whole 
in the Constitutional Court and avoided the technical 
difficulties that had bedevilled the Fourie applicants in 
the High Court.  It also meant that the Constitutional 
Court was not faced merely with individuals who were 
complaining about their desire to marry but also a 
credible organisation demonstrating that this was a 
widely held view among numbers of  gays and lesbians.
 61.6.   Ultimately, despite the vigorous government appeal 
and the intervention by a number of  Christian groups 
opposed to same-sex marriage, the Constitutional Court 
held unanimously in Minister of  Home Affairs v Fourie 
2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) that it was unconstitutional for 
the common law and legislation to prohibit same-sex 
marriage.  The only dissent related to the appropriate 
remedy with one judge (O’Regan J) suggesting that the 
declaration of  invalidity should take effect immediately 
while other judges suggested that it should take place 
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2007: Demonstration in favour of gay marriage: after a protracted campaign by LGBTI 
groups, Parliament voted the Civil Unions Bill into law, in December 2007, recognising 
same-sex marriages and  giving legal force to the Constitutional Court ruling
Pic: Nadine Hutton
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over a longer term to allow Parliament to correct the 
defect itself. 
 61.7.   That all ten sitting judges of  the court, including some 
who can legitimately be described as relatively morally 
conservative, could reach this decision unanimously is 
remarkable.  It must be attributed in significant degree, 
in our view, to the careful litigation strategy embarked 
on by the Coalition over the proceeding eight years. 
That strategy succeeded in establishing and entrenching 
principles regarding the need for equal treatment of  gays 
and lesbians in all contexts so emphatically that it made 
it virtually impossible for the Constitutional Court to do 
anything but follow through to the logical conclusion 
that same-sex marriage (in one form or another) was 
necessary.  
62.   What remained was to lobby Parliament to persuade it to amend 
the law to allow gay marriage, as required by the Constitutional 
Court order within 12 months of  that order.  
 62.1.   This was a difficult process.  Public hearings held on the 
bill produced vigorous public dissent on this issue, and 
some members of  Parliament were apparently deeply 
uncomfortable with the suggestion that gay marriage 
should be allowed.  
 62.2.   Nevertheless, armed with the powerful Constitutional 
Court precedent and the threat that at the end of  the 12-
month period the court’s order of  invalidity would come 
into effect, the Civil Union Act 17 of  2006 was passed, 
giving gays and lesbians the right to obtain virtually all 
the benefits of  marriage without actually calling the 
union “marriage”. 
 62.3.   The Act is certainly not perfect and certain members 
of  the gay and lesbian community have significant 
objections to it.  What cannot be doubted, however, is 
that there is a massive advance on many countries in 
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the world in that it confers virtually all the benefits of  
marriage on same-sex couples. 
63.  In our view, the litigation of  the Coalition, its successors and 
individual gays and lesbians provides a virtual blueprint regarding 
successful public interest litigation in terms of  achieving legal 
change.  When, in Section 4 of  this report, we set out the 
seven factors essential for success in public interest litigation, 
virtually all of  them were present in this campaign.  They include 
particularly:
 63.1.   The presence of  a well-organised client who was a repeat 
player in constitutional litigation;
 63.2.   An overall long-term strategy to achieve a goal step by 
step;
 63.3.   An organisation that not only co-ordinated litigation 
around these issues, but generally had the legitimacy to 
ensure that the correct cases were brought at the right 
time; and
 63.4.  An impeccable sense of  timing.
64.   However, the very same example also demonstrates that even the 
best planned and executed litigation which succeeds in achieving 
legal change, may have far more limited effects in terms of  social 
change. 
65.   On the one hand, the social change resulting from the litigation 
is obvious. Gays and lesbians have experienced massive tangible 
benefits – they can have sex lawfully, have immigration rights, can 
adopt children, derive pension and inheritance benefits, and enter 
into civil unions.
66.   On the other hand, there is a massive gulf  between this legal 
recognition and the attitude of  many ordinary South Africans on 
these issues. As one respondent in the gay and lesbian sector 
explained:
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  “Litigation strategies must be coupled with community-based 
activism and popularisation of legal advocacy to allow a deepening 
of public engagement with the issue of socio-economic rights. 
Rights are not only won through the courts, for they are only 
as lasting and meaningful as the extent to which they can be 
accessed. In our sector, an over-reliance of legal means to 
facilitate social change has meant that we now have a large gap 
between the policy and the personal reality, on a range of rights 
issues.”
67.  The respondent emphasised this point repeatedly throughout its 
engagement with us:
  “A growing gap exists between our Constitution, our law and 
public opinion ... The translation of techno-legal argument into a 
colloquial argument should be a strategy that forms part of any 
litigation aimed at facilitating social change . . . The law may well 
create a vehicle for change, and expand the parameters for such 
change, but the nature and extent of transformation will be driven 
by the people and communities that are impacted by litigation 
efforts. Also, access to social justice will be facilitated by public 
processes and expanded services, not by legislative change 
alone. The power of administrative bureaucracies needs also to 
be taken on as part of the advocacy strategy to affect impact 
as a result of litigation. In many respects, the law is ahead of 
the populous and so the weightiness and legitimacy of political 
leadership and the legislature are critical in transformation that 
is meaningful and sustainable.”
68.   The gay and lesbian litigation example thus demonstrates a key 
issue dealt with in this report:  even where legal victories result 
in legal change and tangible benefits for those concerned, they 
do not necessarily achieve sufficient social change if  they are 
not done in conjunction with additional social mobilisation and 
advocacy strategies.  
69.   This is demonstrated partly by the Civil Unions Act.  If  there had 
been greater public support for gay marriage at the time it was 
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being debated, it may have been possible to persuade Parliament 
to simply amend the Marriage Act to allow gays and lesbians 
to marry under that Act, rather than creating the separate Civil 
Unions Act.  Moreover there would have been far less pressure 
to allow civil servants the right to refuse to perform civil union 
ceremonies on “conscientious objection grounds”, something that 
made its way into the Civil Unions Act and which is of  concern to 
many in the gay and lesbian community.
THE GROOTBOOM CASE ON THE RIGHT TO 
HOUSING 
70.   The second case study we have selected is perhaps the best known 
of  South Africa’s cases on socio-economic rights: Government of  
the Republic of  South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 
2001 (1) SA 46 (CC).
71.   In some ways, the Grootboom case could not present a greater 
contrast with the gay and lesbian litigation already discussed. 
While the gay and lesbian litigation took place on the basis of  
a carefully formulated strategy over eight years and multiple 
cases, the Grootboom litigation was a single case, brought under 
circumstances of  great urgency to deal with people in a truly 
desperate situation.
72.   Though the basic facts of  the case and the legal principles 
enunciated are relatively well known, there has been little or no 
assessment of  the underlying facts and circumstances that led 
to the litigation.  Indeed, even the outcomes of  Grootboom have 
generally been insufficiently considered. 
73.   It is necessary at this stage properly to sketch these facts, 
circumstances and outcomes in order to place the Grootboom 
litigation in proper perspective and adequately draw lessons from 
it for this report.  This is particularly so given that our brief  made 
explicitly clear that one of  the issues The Atlantic Philanthropies 
sought our input on was the reasons for the difference in outcome 
in Grootboom and TAC.
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March 2004: Irene Grootboom: in 1998 the Constitutional Court ruled that the Cape Town local 
authorities had a constitutional obligation to provide shelter to homeless people. The case 
was brought by the Legal Resources Centre representing Irene Grootboom and 900 others
Pic: Ambrose Peters
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Background
74.  The Grootboom case arose in 1998 in the Wallacedene area, where 
approximately 4 000 residents lived.  Almost all the residents lived 
in informal housing/shacks and in appalling conditions.  More than 
a quarter had no income at all and more than two-thirds earned 
less than R500 a month ($75).  There was no water, sewage or 
refuse removal and only five per cent of  the shacks had electricity. 
Most of  the shacks were extremely small.
75.   In September 1998, heavy winter rainfall had left part of  the 
Wallacedene area waterlogged.  In a particular section, the water 
lay as much as a foot deep in the shacks, causing repeated illnesses 
and worsening the already terrible conditions. This section was 
known as Mooi Trap (“step carefully”) because of  all the water. 
Given the at least seven-year housing waiting list, the residents 
faced the prospect of  remaining in intolerable conditions for 
an indefinite period.  As a result, some of  the residents of  this 
section moved out of  Wallacedene and erected their shacks on 
vacant land nearby that was privately owned and that had been 
earmarked for low-cost housing. These residents claimed that 
they did not know that the land was privately owned and that 
they only became aware of  this when the first eviction order was 
subsequently served on them.  The total of  390 adults and 510 
children who ultimately moved to this land named it “New Rust” 
meaning “new rest”. These 900 people were to become known as 
the Grootboom community.
76.   The owner of  the land responded by instituting eviction 
proceedings against the Grootboom community.  An eviction 
order was granted on 8 December 1998 in the local Magistrates’ 
Court.  The Grootboom community did not have a lawyer and was 
not represented at the hearing.  The residents were given a date 
by which they had to leave the land, but did not do so.  They 
maintained that they had nowhere to go as the space they had 
previously occupied at Wallacedene had now been occupied by 
other people.   
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77.   No eviction took place, apparently due to the landowner’s lack of  
funds, but in March 1999, he once again took the community to 
court to have them evicted.  This time the presiding magistrate 
engaged in an unusual move by phoning a local attorney whom 
he knew – Julian Apollos – and asking him to represent the 
community.  
The community’s response to the eviction 
proceedings
78.   With the community having finally been given a lawyer, there 
was a need for an important strategic decision.  What would 
the community’s response be to the eviction proceedings? They 
could oppose the eviction and argue that the requirements of  the 
governing statute, the Prevention of  Illegal Evictions Act 19 of  
1998 had not been met.  They could have launched proceedings 
against the municipality or other levels of  government arguing 
that their constitutional rights were not being upheld.  They chose 
to do neither.  Instead they reached an agreement that they would 
vacate the land by 19 May 1999.  The agreement also provided 
that there would be a mediation between the community and the 
municipality and that the municipality would conduct a study in 
an attempt to identify other land that the community could occupy 
temporarily or permanently.
79.   This decision is intriguing and warrants close attention.  There 
were two main reasons for it.  
 79.1.   First, Apollos apparently took the view that there were no 
legal grounds to object to the eviction.  However, it seems 
that this assessment may well have been incorrect.  The 
Constitutional Court, in its judgment, stated that “nor 
is it clear whether the eviction was in accordance with 
the provisions of  the Prevention of  Illegal Evictions 
Act”. In retrospect there was, at least, an arguable case 
that the Act meant that the community could not be 
evicted without some alternative accommodation being 
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provided, especially because so many members of  the 
community were children.
 79.2.   Second, Apollos took the view that the mediation and 
municipality study would be done in good faith and that 
there was a very good chance of  resolution.  This proved 
overly optimistic.  It turned out that the municipality 
had already done a study of  the area and had concluded 
that there was nowhere else that could be allocated 
to the community.  The mediation failed because the 
municipality’s only response was that the community 
should return to its old land in Wallacedene.  As has 
been mentioned, the community was of  the view that this 
was impossible because the space they had previously 
occupied at Wallacedene had now been occupied by 
other people.   
80.   The decision taken by Apollos and the community makes it clear 
that they were not intent on legal action.  Rather, like most other 
South African communities faced with eviction, they believed that 
they had few legal rights and that their best strategic option was to 
use the law to put off  the eviction for as long as possible.  In doing 
so, they wanted to use their only strategic advantage – the fact 
that they were on the land – to secure some form of  settlement 
from what they hoped would be a sympathetic municipality. 
There was certainly no suggestion at this stage that the law or 
the Constitution could or should be used against the municipality. 
Indeed, they were relying on the goodwill of  the municipality 
and to do so would have been potentially very damaging to their 
chances of  being allocated other land by the municipality, on 
whose goodwill they were depending.
81.   Ultimately, however, they had underestimated their legal rights 
and overestimated the goodwill of  the municipality and, with 
hindsight, the decision to agree to vacate the land was to prove a 
damaging one.  By mid-May, mediation had reached a dead end 
and the community was still on the land with no place to go.  On 
18 May 1999, one day before the community was due to leave, the 
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municipality forcibly evicted the community.  As the Constitutional 
Court described it, the eviction:
   “was done prematurely and inhumanely: reminiscent of 
apartheid-style evictions.  The respondents’ homes were 
bulldozed and burnt and their possessions destroyed.  Many of 
the residents who were not there could not even salvage their 
personal belongings.”
82.   The community was now truly homeless.  There was no space for 
them to return to Wallacedene and their building materials had 
been destroyed.  They were forced to simply camp on the sports 
field adjacent to Wallacedene with whatever plastic sheeting and 
other materials they could find.  Within a week of  the eviction, the 
winter rains began, rendering any shelter that the community had 
virtually worthless.  
The launch of court proceedings
83.   A week after the community had been evicted, Apollos wrote to the 
municipality, describing the intolerable conditions under which the 
community was living and demanding that the municipality meet its 
constitutional obligations and provide temporary accommodation 
for the community.  The letter explained that if  this was not done, 
the community would launch a High Court application to compel 
the government to comply with its constitutional obligations.  The 
municipality responded that it had supplied food and shelter for the 
community at the Wallacedene Community Hall, which bordered 
the sports field.  It also explained that it was approaching the 
Western Cape provincial government for assistance in dealing with 
the problem.  However, the community was dissatisfied with this 
response since the hall in question could only house 80 people 
who were not allowed to stay there at night.
84.   As a result, on 31 May 1999, Apollos launched an urgent application 
on behalf  of  the community in the Cape High Court.  They sought 
an order:
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  “(i) Directing first respondent, alternatively one or more of the 
other respondents, forthwith to provide adequate and sufficient 
basic temporary shelter and/or housing for the applicants and 
their children in such premises, and/or on such land, as is/may 
be owned and/or leased by one or more of the respondents, 
pending applicants and their children obtaining permanent 
accommodation;
  “(ii) Directing first respondent, alternatively one or more of the 
other respondents, forthwith to provide adequate and sufficient 
basic nutrition, shelter, health and care services and social 
services to all of the applicants’ children.”
85.   It was the first time the community had asserted any of  its 
constitutional rights with regard to shelter and housing.  Indeed, 
it may have been the first time any community in South Africa had 
asserted such rights.  Despite the fact that the right to housing 
had been included in the Constitution for over 18 months at that 
time – and despite the fact that many communities had been 
faced with eviction and forced to live in terrible conditions, just as 
the Grootboom community had – to our knowledge there had been 
little or no litigation by communities claiming this right. 
86.   Taken at face value, the strategic decision to embark on litigation 
is in itself  unremarkable.  Negotiations had failed, the community 
no longer held the advantage of  being on the disputed land and 
they no longer trusted the municipality.  But this view obscures 
a broader question – what was it that put this community in a 
position to demand their rights when virtually no other community 
had done so?
87.   It appears that there were three key factors: the community 
had legal representation, the unusually high level of  community 
organisation and the role of  politics.  
 87.1.   The first factor – that Apollos was asked to represent 
the community by the magistrate and agreed to do so 
with no likelihood of  fees being paid – was crucial.  It 
was Apollos who suggested litigation, who drafted the 
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The Grootboom informal settlement today
Pic: supplied by Legal Resource Centre
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court papers and who secured the advocates to argue 
the case.  Without his involvement, the litigation would 
not have occurred.
 87.2.   The presence of  Apollos also relates to the second factor 
– the high level of  organisation of  the community.  When 
the community first met Apollos during the eviction 
hearings, he had to deal with more than 150 adults 
simultaneously. He refused to do this and insisted 
that the community elect a five-person committee to 
deal with him. They did so and it was then that Irene 
Grootboom and Lucky Gwaza emerged as the leaders of  
the community.  This committee was to play a key role in 
directing the strategies of  the community, in providing 
the information and background necessary for the court 
application and in keeping the community involved in 
and informed of  the court application.  The committee 
was assisted in this regard by Doris Neewat, a former 
ANC councillor who lived nearby and had a law degree, 
but was not a practising lawyer.
 87.3.   It is the third factor, the role of  politics, which is the 
most intriguing.  
 87.3.1.   It is not discussed at all in the Constitutional Court 
judgment of  the case, nor in the court record, that prior 
to launching the court application, the community tried 
to take the matter into their own hands.  A few days 
after being evicted on to the sports field, the community 
organised a march to the offices of  the municipality. 
They were encouraged to do so by Doris Neewat. The 
marchers forced their way into a council meeting and 
demanded that something be done about their plight.
 87.3.2.   Though the members of  the municipality were unmoved 
by the community’s actions, they did respond in one way 
that was to prove important. They phoned a prominent 
ANC provincial politician and asked him to sort the 
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situation out. He immediately held discussions with the 
community leaders and with Apollos and Neewat.  
 87.3.3.   However, far from sorting the situation out, it was during 
these discussions that the community decided to embark 
on legal action against the municipality.  While it is clear 
that the community saw this as a way of  gaining access 
to some relief  and possibly housing, there were broader 
political ramifications at play.  Various ANC role players, 
including the prominent provincial politician already 
referred to, wanted to demonstrate that the New National 
Party (NNP), the opposition party which controlled the 
relevant province and municipality, was not serving the 
community adequately.  This was particularly so because 
the 1999 national and provincial elections were at that 
point only a couple of  weeks away.   
88.   This political backdrop to the case is important for a number of  
reasons.   
 88.1.   First, it points to the fact, again, that neither Apollos 
nor the community was intent on legal action.  The 
community was intent on using popular pressure and 
Apollos was following his clients’ instructions and had 
therefore not instituted legal proceedings.  It was only 
the intervention of  the ANC provincial leadership that 
led to the court action.  
 88.2.   Second, it demonstrates that even at this early stage 
of  the case there was already a potential divergence 
of  interests between on the one hand, the community 
and their lawyer and, on the other, the broader political 
cause of  embarrassing the NNP.  
 88.3.   Third, and most importantly, it suggests that the demand 
of  rights would not have happened in the same way had 
this not been a case of  the community and its attorney 
being strong ANC supporters and therefore being pitted 
against the NNP-run local municipality.  This is a point 
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that has to be borne carefully in mind for future public 
interest litigation.
The High Court proceedings
89.   Ultimately though, and whatever the initial political intentions, 
the litigation was launched against all three levels of  government 
involved in providing housing – the local and provincial governments 
controlled by the NNP, and the national government controlled by 
the ANC.  The attack focussed only on the provision of  housing or 
shelter to the 900 applicants – not to any broader group.  
90.   A few days after the urgent application had been lodged, a 
judge of  the Cape High Court conducted an in loco inspection 
of  the conditions under which the Grootboom community was 
living.  He was sufficiently moved to order that, pending the final 
determination of  the application, temporary accommodation had 
to be provided for the children in the community hall, as well as 
for one parent of  each child who required supervision.  
91.   The High Court ultimately concluded that given the pressing 
demands and scarce resources that the state faced, it had not 
breached its obligations under the right to housing in terms of  
Section 26 of  the Constitution, especially because that section 
explicitly referred to the “available resources” of  the state.  However, 
it also concluded that the state was in breach of  its obligations to 
provide children with shelter in terms of  Section 28(1)(c) of  the 
Constitution, because it had not provided shelter to children in a 
situation where their parents were unable to provide it.
92.   This was an enormous victory because, for the first time, the 
socio-economic rights in the Constitution seemed to have come to 
fruition.  The community’s lawyers did an excellent job of  portraying 
the dire situation in which the community found themselves – an 
argument that was undoubtedly greatly assisted by having literally 
hundreds of  community members in court, including children and 
babies.   Faced with this scene of  desperate people and knowing the 
dreadful winter conditions in the Cape, there was clearly immense 
pressure on the court to give the community some relief.
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93.   However, despite the victory, it was already becoming clear that 
the hurried manner in which the case had been litigated and the 
fact that the legal team lacked experience in the new untested 
realm of  socio-economic rights meant there had been some 
significant errors.  As the Cape High Court judgment made clear, 
the application of  the Grootboom community had given insufficient 
attention to the remedy that would be appropriate.  They had not 
indicated the nature of  the shelter to be provided, its location or 
which of  the respondents should be responsible therefore.  Indeed, 
it was only in the replying affidavits that the applicants, through 
their attorney, made some practical suggestions as to the nature 
of  the relief.  The court therefore could not grant any specific relief  
and was forced to postpone the case for three months, pending 
proposals from both sides on the relief  that should be given.
The Constitutional Court hearing
94.   Before this could be done, however, the government unsurprisingly 
launched an appeal against the judgment before the Constitutional 
Court. The court granted leave to appeal and set the case down 
for hearing. At the same time, the South African Human Rights 
Commission and the Community Law Centre intervened in the 
Constitutional Court as amici curiae, represented by the Legal 
Resources Centre (LRC).
95.   When the case was heard before the Constitutional Court and 
when the court ultimately delivered its judgment, it turned out 
that a fundamental shift occurred from the original narrow case to 
a far broader cause.
96.   First, the Constitutional Court proved extremely reluctant to follow 
the High Court approach and decide the case on the basis of  the 
children’s rights involved. 
 96.1.    This was partly because it would mean that in this case 
and future cases, adults without children would not be 
accommodated at all, which seemed at odds with the 
spirit of  the Constitution.  More importantly, because 
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the children’s rights contained no limitation with regard 
to resources, upholding them here would potentially 
“open the floodgates” to all claims from homeless 
children which would place unmanageable pressure on 
the state and the court. With this concern in mind, the 
court hearing and judgment focussed on the Section 
26 right to housing instead of  the Section 28 children’s 
right to shelter.  
 96.2.   This was despite the fact that the community’s lawyers 
had abandoned this leg of  their argument when the case 
reached the Constitutional Court, presumably because 
it had been so thoroughly dismissed by the Cape High 
Court.  
 96.3.   The space for the court to focus on Section 26 was created 
partly by the submissions of  the LRC, representing the 
amici curiae, which urged the court to decide the case on 
Section 26 instead of  Section 28.  The LRC argued that 
the government housing programme, though substantial 
in size, did not comply with the state’s obligations under 
Section 26 and contended that it was important for the 
court to clarify this in its judgment and order to ensure 
that the Constitution was upheld.
97.   Second, the case shifted away from the particular needs of  the 
Grootboom community.  
 97.1.   At the start of  the court hearing, the government 
surprised everyone by offering the community “some 
alternative accommodation, not in fulfilment of  any 
accepted constitutional obligation, but in the interests 
of  humanity and pragmatism”. This was not an offer 
of  settlement and the community accepted the offer 
without prejudice. 
 97.2.   As an aside, though the offer was not one of  settlement, 
this illustrates how easily the government might have 
used the narrow claim of  the particular group of  plaintiffs 
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2003: Eldorado Park, near Johannesburg: “Red Ants”, guards hired by the municipal 
authorities, break down shelters and evict residents  from an “illegal” informal settlement
Pic: Nadine Hutton
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to thwart the precedent-setting value of  the case.  A 
proper offer of  settlement to the plaintiffs would have 
been almost impossible to resist and this would have 
prevented the case going ahead and a Constitutional 
Court-level precedent being established.
 97.3.   Nevertheless the offer had a significant effect. Suddenly 
it seemed far less important for the court to give a 
remedy that assisted the community directly.  The court 
therefore began to look even more closely at the broader 
implications of  the case rather than the plaintiffs 
involved. 
 97.4.   This was exacerbated by the decision not to have 
any of  the community members in court.  While this 
must have seemed sensible at the time, one can never 
overestimate the value of  having real plaintiffs being 
visible at court proceedings – especially where the 
plaintiffs’ circumstances were as sympathetic as those 
of  the Grootboom community.
98.   Thirdly, again at the instance of  the LRC, the focus of  the legal 
arguments became whether the precise parameters and contours 
of  the government’s housing policy met its constitutional 
obligations.  This was a shift from the far starker arguments that 
the plaintiffs’ lawyers were making, which asked simply whether 
these people had housing and if  not, whether the government 
could afford to supply it to them.
99.   These shifts had a profound effect on the outcome of  the case.  In 
its judgment:
 99.1.   The court reversed the Cape High Court’s ruling on both 
issues before it by finding a violation of  the Section 26 
right to housing, but not a violation of  the Section 28 
children’s right to shelter.
 99.2.   The court emphatically rejected the notion that the 
constitutional rights could be used by individual plaintiffs 
to claim “housing on demand”, finding instead that such 
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cases only involved an evaluation of  the “reasonableness” 
of  the government programme at issue.
 99.3.   Despite finding a violation of  Section 26, the court did 
not give a tangible remedial order to the community. 
Instead it issued a declaratory order explaining that 
the government’s policy generally was a breach of  the 
Section 26 right to housing.  It declared as follows:
     “(a)  Section 26(2) of the Constitution requires the 
state to devise and implement within its available 
resources a comprehensive and co-ordinated 
programme progressively to realise the right of 
access to adequate housing.
    “(b)  The programme must include reasonable 
measures such as, but not necessarily limited to, 
those contemplated in the Accelerated Managed 
Land Settlement Programme, to provide relief 
for people who have no access to land, no roof 
over their heads, and who are living in intolerable 
conditions or crisis situations.
     “(c)  As at the date of the launch of this application, the 
state housing programme in the area of the Cape 
Metropolitan Council fell short of compliance with 
the requirements in paragraph (b), in that it failed 
to make reasonable provision within its available 
resources for people in the Cape Metropolitan area 
with no access to land, no roof over their heads, 
and who were living in intolerable conditions or 
crisis situations.”
The effect of the LRC intervention
100.  The intervention of  the LRC had complex repercussions. On the 
one hand, the intervention may be seen as damaging to the case 
because it took the focus away from the individual plaintiffs and 
their situation and focussed on the government programme to the 
potential exclusion of  individual relief.  
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101.  However, had it not been for the intervention of  the LRC, in our view 
it appears quite possible, and even likely, that the case might have 
been lost and would not have produced any binding precedent in 
favour of  the right to housing for the plaintiffs, particularly once 
they had accepted the government’s humanitarian offer.  The critical 
role of  the LRC’s intervention has recently been emphasised by 
Justice Albie Sachs.  As he explains:
  “The amicus intervention swung the debate dramatically.  Most 
of the preceding arguments had failed to really look socio-
economic rights in the eye.  There had been technical arguments 
and attempts to frame the case in terms of children’s rights, 
but [the LRC intervention] forced us to consider what the nature 
of the obligations imposed by these rights was.  Although we 
didn’t accept the entire argument of the amici, this wasn’t vital. 
What was important was the nature of the discourse.  It was 
placing socio-economic rights at the centre of our thinking and 
doctrine.”
  Albie Sachs, “Concluding Comments on the Panel Discussion” in ESR 
Review, vol 8, no 1, May 2007
102.  One has to accept that this was an exceptionally difficult case.  It 
was not a case about a government doing nothing or ignoring the 
Constitution.  The government had put in place a massive housing 
programme to deliver housing to poor people and the court was 
acutely aware of  the challenges facing the government. The court 
cited figures stating that 362 160 houses were built or were under 
construction between March 1994 and September 1997, while an 
overall total of  some 637 190 subsidies had been allocated for 
projects in various stages of  planning or development by October 
1997.
103.  Thus for all the blunt arguments made by the community’s lawyers 
about how their clients did not have housing, it was far from clear 
that this amounted to a breach of  the right to housing where 
government was distributing houses to thousands of  poor people, 
but had not reached these plaintiffs yet.
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104.  What the LRC’s intervention managed to do was analyse the 
government’s programme with a sophistication and nuance that 
was lacking in the plaintiffs’ case.  It emphasised the size and 
scope of  the government’s housing programme, but argued that 
it suffered from a crucial flaw.  This was that it was an “all or 
nothing” policy – while poor people got proper houses under the 
policy, they got nothing at all while waiting on the inordinately long 
waiting list, a wait that often took years.  The LRC argued that 
in addition to its housing programme, the Constitution required 
the government to do something in the interim for people who 
were waiting and living in appalling circumstances.  This involved 
security of  tenure, effective protection from the elements and 
basic water and sanitation services.
105.  Though a number of  the LRC’s legal submissions were ultimately 
rejected, its approach to and analysis of  the government’s 
programme proved to be the core around which the judgment was 
based.  In particular, it looked at the government’s policies and 
showed that the government itself  had identified the need for an 
“Accelerated Land Management Settlement Scheme” that would 
cater to people in desperate need, but had failed to put such a 
programme in place.  
106.  Without the LRC’s intervention and approach, it is quite possible 
that Grootboom would have had to go the way of  Soobramoney 
v Minister of  Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). As 
discussed above, there in its first decision on socio-economic 
rights, the Constitutional Court held that it could not come to 
the assistance of  a dying man needing dialysis treatment as the 
government’s policy did not violate the right to health care.  
107.  A loss in Grootboom following the loss in Soobramoney would 
have been potentially devastating to future socio-economic rights 
litigation in South Africa.
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Outcomes of the case for the Grootboom community
108.  As has been discussed above, at the hearing of  the case before 
the Constitutional Court, the government made an offer of  some 
“temporary accommodation” for the community consisting of  “a 
marked-off  site; provision for temporary structures intended to 
be waterproof; basic sanitation, water and refuse services”. The 
Grootboom community accepted the offer. The court’s judgment 
referred to this offer and its acceptance, but gave the community 
no additional relief.
109.  But even this offer, which had been initiated by the government 
and should have been relatively simple to implement, took months 
to be put in place.  The offer was made on 11 May 2000.  Four 
months later, and with the court’s judgment still pending, nothing 
had been done to fulfil this offer.  The Grootboom community 
was therefore forced to go back to the Constitutional Court with 
an urgent application to compel fulfilment of  the offer.   At the 
hearing of  the urgent application, the parties agreed on details 
regarding the implementation of  the offer and these details were 
then, by consent, made an order of  court.  
110.  Over the next few months, the offer was gradually implemented. 
The community continued to live on the Wallacedene sports field 
in their shacks, while the government put in place the temporary 
and then permanent sanitation and water services required by 
the offer and urgent order.  Also as per the urgent order, the 
government paid over an amount of  R200 000 ($30 000) for the 
purposes of  obtaining materials to make the community shacks 
waterproof.  At the insistence of  the community, these materials 
were bought and distributed by Julian Apollos, ensuring that the 
community got substantial value for the money, rather than letting 
the government buy the materials themselves.  
111.  Though the government had taken months to comply with the 
terms of  the offer and urgent order and though there was some 
disagreement about whether every aspect of  the order had been 
complied with, it is clear that generally the terms of  the offer and 
order were fulfilled by the government. 
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112.  However, it is equally clear that, despite this, the majority of  the 
Grootboom community continues to live in appalling conditions to 
this day and many are deeply disillusioned with the legal processes 
involved in the case.  As community leader Lucky Gwaza put it in 
a newspaper article published a few years ago:
  “After the court case, we were very, very happy as a community 
because they gave us many, many promises, but we see nothing 
happened except the toilets and the taps.” 
113.  Quoted in the same article, community member Bukiwe Fukutha 
put it even more bluntly: 
  “The court’s ruling has nothing to do with housing and everything 
to do with creating work for lawyers.”
114.  The community’s disillusionment seems to stem mainly from its 
perception that the court victory meant that they would ultimately 
be getting actual housing, rather than some temporary form of  
shelter. Though the community was very pleased with the temporary 
offer made by the government and celebrated when it was fulfilled, 
they continued to feel frustrated that they had not yet been 
accommodated in the government’s formal housing programme. 
This frustration is understandable.  In the community’s view, and 
even in the view of  the arguments the community’s lawyers made 
before the court, this was a case where people’s rights had been 
violated because they were homeless.  The natural remedy, of  
course, would then be to provide the necessary housing.
115.  The reality, however, is that nothing in the court’s judgment 
suggested that formal housing for the community was on the 
immediate horizon.  Rather the court’s judgment focusses on the 
far narrower violation that took place because the government 
did not have a programme in place to provide temporary relief  to 
people in desperate situations.  In fact, the court went as far as 
to stress that the government’s formal housing programme was 
a “major achievement” in which a “significant number of  houses 
[have] been built” even though it also found that the housing 
programme was having, at best, a small effect on the massive 
housing backlog facing South Africa. 
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116.  It is difficult properly to assess the community’s over-inflated 
expectations and consequent disillusionment. The expectations 
seem to have resulted at least partly from a lack of  clear 
communication between the lawyer and his clients about the 
likely and actual outcomes of  the case.  This was notwithstanding 
the community’s organisational structure that was developed and 
referred to earlier.
117.  The community’s position appeared to have been weakened further 
by the fact that they no longer had effective legal representation. 
A few months after the case concluded, Julian Apollos merged 
his two-man law firm with the larger firm that represented the 
Oostenberg municipality in the case.  There is no other law firm 
in the closest town. This has meant that recently, when the 
Grootboom community wanted to consider bringing another 
action against the government, it had no lawyer to represent 
them. The organisational structure of  the community has also 
been significantly weakened.  When the LRC recently attempted 
to assist the community to negotiate with the government, there 
seemed to be a lack of  effective leadership in the community 
which made the process extremely difficult.
Broader outcomes
118.  Despite the community’s feeling of  disillusionment, it must be 
stressed that the Grootboom case has had a significant and 
tangible effect in a number of  broader respects.
119.  First, the decision significantly affected the government’s housing 
policy.
 119.1.   Initially and disappointingly, the decision appeared to 
be having very little effect on the government’s housing 
policy.  Grootboom held that what the Constitution 
required was a short-term emergency relief  policy for all 
people who find themselves in desperate circumstances, 
but there was initially no sign of  the government putting 
such a policy in place.  
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 119.2.   However, in August 2003, three years after the decision 
was given, national and provincial governments finally 
did approve such a policy of  short-term emergency 
relief  for people in desperate circumstances.  It is worth 
quoting a summary of  the policy:
     “[This policy] deals with the rules for exceptional urgent 
housing situations. [It relates] to assistance to people 
who, for reasons beyond their control, find themselves 
in a situation of exceptional and urgent housing need 
such as the fact that their existing shelter has been 
destroyed or damaged, their prevailing situation poses 
an immediate threat to their life, health and safety, or 
they have been evicted, or face the threat of imminent 
eviction. The assistance provided consists of funds 
in the form of grants to municipalities to give effect 
to accelerated land development, the provision of 
basic municipal engineering services and shelter. 
The assistance provided falls short of formal housing 
as provided for in other Programmes of the Housing 
Subsidy Scheme contained in the Housing Code, and 
is thus rendered only in situations of exceptional and 
urgent housing need.”
 119.3.   This emergency relief  policy explicitly acknowledges 
that it was devised and accepted as a direct result of  the 
Grootboom decision and aims to meet what Grootboom 
laid down as the constitutional requirements of  the right 
to housing.  
 119.4.   Whether or not this policy means that everyone in 
desperate need will actually receive relief  from the 
government remains to be seen, but it does vastly 
increase the possibility of  such people obtaining 
assistance.  And, of  course, now that the government 
has committed itself  to this policy, it should be far easier 
for community lawyers to argue that not only are people 
entitled to such relief, but that such relief  is within the 
government’s financial and other resources.
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120.  Second, the decision played a major role in altering South African 
law on housing and evictions.  The Constitution requires that no 
eviction be granted until “all the relevant circumstances” have 
been taken into account by a court. As a result, a number of  
court decisions have held that that the absence of  an effective 
Grootboom-type programme of  emergency relief  might preclude 
evictions being granted at all because people would be left in 
desperate circumstances.  Though this matter  has not been finally 
resolved (a pending matter before the Constitutional Court should 
result in it being determined)  whatever the outcome there can be 
no question that South African courts have massively departed 
from previous case law on evictions and Grootboom is an obvious 
driving force.  This impact is likely to be felt very strongly by people 
on the ground, because in effect it gives them security of  tenure 
that they would not otherwise have had.
121.  Third, the decision has impacted significantly on the government’s 
attitude to socio-economic rights and socio-economic rights 
cases. It looms large as an indication that where the government 
fails to act reasonably, it will be taken to court and defeated.  It 
is for this reason that, according to a number of  respondents, 
the government has begun factoring these issues into its budget-
making processes and has become far more responsive to lawyers’ 
letters pointing out programme flaws and requesting information. 
This is despite the fact that many government departments and 
officials had (and continue to have) misgivings about the decision. 
But, because they recognise that it is good law and will be enforced 
against them in court, they take it into account.
122.  Lastly, there can be no doubt that the Grootboom decision has 
had an enormous impact on subsequent socio-economic rights 
litigation and will continue to be the foundational socio-economic 
rights decision for many years to come.  
 122.1.   In 2002, two years later, the Constitutional Court 
repeatedly relied on Grootboom in deciding the TAC case. 
This case, which we deal with as the third case study, 
was an enormously important and controversial case 
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dealing with the provision of  drugs for the prevention of  
mother-to-child transmission of  HIV/AIDS.
 122.2.   Given the government’s vociferous defense of  its AIDS 
policy and the public attention and controversy that the 
case generated, it might have been expected that this 
would be a difficult and close decision. The reality though, 
as various respondents made clear to us, was that it was 
the Grootboom principles regarding “reasonableness” 
that made the decision relatively easy, at least as to 
whether there had been a violation of  the Constitution. 
Without Grootboom, the TAC case would have been far 
more difficult to launch and decide and, in the words of  
one respondent, “may not have happened at all when it 
did”.
 122.3.   The approach in Grootboom and the principles it laid 
down has also had a substantial effect in a number 
of  socio-economic rights cases that have been 
brought subsequently on issues such as social grants, 
education and others. By holding that socio-economic 
rights are enforceable and by insisting on subjecting 
all government socio-economic rights policies to a 
rigorous “reasonableness” standard, Grootboom has 
made possible many future cases to ensure that the 
government is acting appropriately to achieve the 
progressive realisation of  the socio-economic rights 
enshrined in the Constitution. 
 122.4.   Thus, ironically, whatever the limits of  Grootboom for 
social change in the Grootboom community, it presents 
a remarkable and valuable victory that has and will 
continue to play a key role in achieving tangible social 
change for other plaintiffs in a variety of  areas.
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Lesson to be learnt
123.  The lessons to be learnt from Grootboom really permeate this 
entire report. We deal with these issues in detail below.  Suffice to 
say at this point that Grootboom demonstrates that:
 123.1.   Awareness of  rights is an absolute precondition if  
communities are to enforce their rights in a manner that 
leads to social change.
 123.2.   Similarly, advice and assistance are essential if  people 
are to enforce their rights. This must include legal 
representation where necessary and, on a case of  this 
scale and complexity, the legal representatives should 
ideally be familiar with the national and international 
law at play.
 123.3.   However, these two facets are by themselves likely 
insufficient.  What is necessary is for the communities 
to become socially mobilised, structurally organised and 
actively involved.  This includes using political pressure 
wherever possible.
124.   Finally, of  all the factors necessary to ensure that litigation 
leads to social change, perhaps the most significant is follow-
up.  This applies irrespective of  the kind of  remedy granted by 
the court.
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HIV positive mother and HIV negative child: provision of Nevirapine during her pregnancy 
prevented her child from contracting the disease while in the womb
Pic: Helen MacDonald
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THE TREATMENT ACTION CAMPAIGN CASE 
ON THE PREVENTION OF MOTHER-TO-CHILD 
TRANSMISSION OF HIV/AIDS
125.  One of  the most well-known of  all the decisions of  the Constitutional 
Court, at least in the public eye, is the TAC case.  Unlike the two 
earlier case studies we have dealt with, in the TAC case we have 
the advantage of  a full write-up of  the background, strategies and 
outcomes of  the case, written by someone directly involved in it.  
126.  The piece, “Preventing Mother-to-Child HIV Transmission in South 
Africa: Background, Strategies and Outcomes of  the Treatment 
Action Campaign Case against the Minister of  Health” in (2003) 
19 SAJHR 278 – 315,  was written by Mark Heywood, head of  the 
AIDS Law Project and national secretary of  the Treatment Action 
Campaign.  
127.  In what follows, rather than attempting to re-state the facts relating 
to the Treatment Action Campaign case in our own words, we have 
instead made extensive use of  Heywood’s piece. 
Introduction
128.  For pregnant women with HIV, there is a 30 per cent risk that the 
child will be infected with HIV, mostly during the birth and breast-
feeding period. This issue was extremely important in South Africa 
given that, by 1998, it was estimated that up to 70 000 children 
were born every year with HIV and there were already signs that 
rising infant mortality was being caused by HIV.  Most of  these 
children live short, painful lives, with HIV infection carrying a 
terrible toll for both parents and children.  
129.  However, one of  the earliest and most enduring breakthroughs 
in the AIDS epidemic was the discovery in 1994 that use of  the 
antiretroviral drug AZT could dramatically reduce the risk of  mother-
to-child HIV transmission (MTCT).  However, it was realised that 
this would be of  limited efficacy outside industrialised countries 
because of  the need to begin administering the drug relatively 
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early in pregnancy and the infrastructural requirements for its 
delivery.  Consequently, research began for shorter and simpler 
antiretroviral regimens that would also benefit patients in poorer 
countries.  Ultimately, a clinical trial in Thailand demonstrated 
that a short course of  AZT given to mother and child (starting at 
36 weeks of  pregnancy) still brought about significant reductions 
in MTCT.
130.  It was with the aim of  securing the benefits of  these breakthroughs 
in medical science for parents who were HIV positive that, as early 
as 1997, various AIDS organisations began a period of  sustained 
lobbying of  the minister and the Department of  Health to develop 
a policy and programme to prevent MTCT. The objective was to 
pressure the government to implement the “steps to be taken to 
prevent peri-natal transmission of  HIV” listed in the 1994 AIDS 
plan. These included offering HIV testing at antenatal clinics 
on a voluntary basis and conducting research into methods of  
preventing peri-natal transmission such as “short course AZT” 
and “non-nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors”.  
131.  The campaign received renewed impetus in December 1998 when 
the TAC was founded and set as one of  its primary objectives 
a demand that the government implement a programme to 
prevent MTCT. The TAC conducted extensive activities in this 
regard between 1999 and 2001, including meetings with the first 
and second ministers of  health, demonstrations, the drafting of  
memoranda, a 50 000 person petition to the president and a 
campaign that targeted pharmaceutical companies to reduce the 
prices of  essential antiretroviral medicines, particularly AZT.  
132.  Initially demands for a policy and plan on MTCT received a relatively 
sympathetic ear from the government. In 1998, for example, the 
Gauteng health department responded timeously to the results 
of  the Bangkok-Thai study by announcing the establishment 
of  five pilot sites where programmes to reduce MTCT would be 
introduced.  On 30 April 1999, a meeting between the TAC and the 
then minister of  health led to a joint statement that the price of  
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A sister of the Msunduzi Hospice comforts a man dying of AIDS at his home outside 
Pietermaritzburg, KwaZulu-Natal province 
Pic: Henner Frankenfeld / PictureNET Africa
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AZT was the major barrier to a MTCT programme and a promise 
that: 
  “Government would name an affordable price for the 
implementation of AZT to pregnant mothers and report within 
six weeks on the price and other issues pertaining to the 
prevention of mother-to-child transmission.”
133.  At this point, it appeared that the TAC’s MTCT campaign would 
primarily target manufacturers of  antiretroviral medicines to 
force them to reduce their prices.  However, an unanticipated and 
unfortunate diversion revealed itself  in late 1999.  
134.  This was the advent of  AIDS denial in South Africa.  Since the 
mid-1990s, there has been a small group of  scientists who had 
developed a thesis that HIV has not been properly isolated as a 
virus, and that the real causes of  AIDS were initially the recreational 
drugs taken by many gay men in the USA in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, and thereafter antiretroviral medicines.  This group 
(often referred to as “AIDS dissidents”) has argued that, rather 
than helping to restore the immune system, antiretroviral drugs 
destroy it by destroying cell replication and causing a range of  life-
threatening side effects.  Although their arguments vary, the basic 
contention is that AIDS in Africa is caused by poverty and that a 
range of  poverty-related illnesses (such as tuberculosis) are mis-
described as HIV-related in order to create markets for first-world 
drugs, particularly antiretrovirals.  
135.  When the TAC launched legal action to demand broader access 
to Nevirapine in 2001, none of  the affidavits filed by government 
officials made reference to these “dissident” views on antiretroviral 
medicines or whether HIV is a cause of  AIDS, as reasons to justify 
the failure to develop or implement a programme.  However, a 
sometimes hidden, sometimes open, relationship has been 
apparent between the president and AIDS denialists and seemed 
to be the primary reason for the delays in establishing an MTCT 
programme.   
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136.  The fact that such a relationship existed was first signalled in 
October 1999, in a speech by President Thabo Mbeki to the 
National Council of  Provinces (NCOP).  At the end of  this speech 
he unexpectedly questioned the safety of  AZT and warned that 
the “toxicity of  this drug is such that it is, in fact, a danger to 
health”. The president informed the NCOP that he had instructed 
the Minister of  Health to launch a probe into the safety of  AZT 
and that, until it was complete, it would not be used in South 
Africa.
137.  From this point onwards, progress with implementation of  a 
national programme to prevent mother-to-child HIV transmission 
was derailed.  Two weeks later, on 16 November 1999, the minister 
of  health announced to the National Assembly that, although she 
was aware of  the positive results of  AZT, “there are other scientists 
who say not enough is yet known about the effects of  the toxic 
profile of  the drug, that the risks might well outweigh the benefits, 
and that the drug should not be used”. As a result, she instructed 
the Medicines Control Council (MCC) to review the use of  AZT.
138.  On 5 April 2000, Minister of  Health Dr Tshabalala-Msimang  made a 
speech to Parliament that had all the hallmarks of  “dissidentese”. 
Raising reasonable concerns about a number of  deaths of  adults 
on therapeutic drug trials that appeared to be associated with daily 
Nevirapine use as part of  a combination of  antiretroviral drugs, 
she confused these deaths with the use of  the same medicine for 
preventing intrapartum HIV transmission – despite the knowledge 
that it requires only one dose to mother and child and the fact that 
there were no reported adverse safety events concerning its use 
in MTCT.  Tshabalala-Msimang remained steadfast in opposition 
to AZT, stating that the government would never use AZT in the 
prevention of  MTCT.  
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The government’s choice of Nevirapine
139.   An important development occurred in July 1999 when the first 
results of  a drug trial run in Uganda and known as the HIVNET 
012, testing the efficacy of  a single dose of  a different drug 
– Nevirapine – in reducing MTCT, were released. The results 
showed that Nevirapine had similar efficacy to AZT but was 
achieved with a much less complex regimen.  
140.   In the face of  presidential opposition to AZT, the minister of  
health and others latched on to Nevirapine as an alternative and 
quickly arranged a study tour to Uganda, which included the 
objective of  hearing more of  the trial of  this drug.
141.   In answer to the growing pressure from the TAC, Nevirapine was 
now offered as the government’s probable medicine of  choice 
and the TAC was persuaded to stall its demands pending the 
outcome of  a local trial known as the South African Intrapartum 
Nevirapine Trial (“SAINT”).  The TAC accepted the bona fides 
of  the minister and for a period of  nine months pressure on 
government policy on MTCT was reduced and the TAC engaged 
in a number of  other successful campaigns that aimed to bring 
down the price of  essential anti-HIV medicines and targeted 
patent abuse and drug pricing.  This was not well received by 
clinicians working on MTCT who felt that the TAC had “let the 
government off  the hook” over MTCT.  
142.  As the preliminary results of  the SAINT study supported the use 
of  Nevirapine and had started to leak out in mid-2000, a new 
catalogue of  excuses emerged from the minister of  health. It 
seemed as if  the clinicians’ concerns were correct.
143.   Fear of  further delays and political interference in public 
health policy appeared to be confirmed at the International 
AIDS Conference held in Durban in July 2000.  The conference 
opened in controversy as President Mbeki spoke eloquently 
about poverty, but refused to name HIV as a specific challenge 
for Africa.  At the same time, the government declined an offer 
from Boehringer Ingelheim, the manufacturer of  Nevirapine, for 
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a “free” supply of  the drug for five years and reacted coolly to 
a preliminary announcement of  the SAINT results.  It took the 
intervention of  former president Nelson Mandela to quell the 
storm. In his closing speech at the conference, he called for 
widespread interventions to prevent MTCT.
144.   In response to these developments, the TAC publicly re-instated 
its threat of  litigation.  This threat of  legal action in July 2000 
raises important issues about the timing and objectives of  
the litigation.  By this time, the TAC’s campaigns had already 
made government policy on MTCT a matter of  national concern 
and had achieved wide support. At the International AIDS 
Conference, the TAC seriously considered bringing an urgent 
High Court application for access to Nevirapine on behalf  of  
several women in the late stages of  pregnancy.  However, despite 
scientific consensus on its safety and efficacy, the medicine was 
not yet registered in South Africa for the prevention of  MTCT. 
AZT was registered, but it was felt that the greater cost of  this 
medicine, together with a more complicated drug regimen 
(AZT must be taken daily from 36 weeks of  pregnancy) made 
successful litigation more difficult. The TAC’s legal counsel 
cautioned against commencing litigation before Nevirapine was 
registered.  
145.   This was because although the TAC could point to precedents 
for “off-label” use of  medicines, and even instances where 
government policy endorsed this, a court would likely have 
stuck to the strict letter of  the law.  For a court formally to 
condone “off-label” use of  medicines was inviting compromise 
in the system of  medicine registration.  There was no option 
for the TAC but to continue the campaign, but also to delay the 
litigation.  Pressure was now turned to the MCC to speed up 
the registration of  the drug and on the government to clarify its 
programme.  
146.   On 12 and 13 August 2000, the Department of  Health convened 
a meeting with South African scientists to assess the new 
knowledge gleaned from the Durban conference.  After this 
meeting, MinMEC (a committee of  the national minister of  
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The coffi n industry has boomed in South Africa since the advent of the HIV/AIDS pandemic 
in the late 1980s. There are more than a thousand deaths a day and in 2008 a quarter of the 
population is infected with HIV
Pic: Henner Frankenfeld
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health and the nine provincial MECs for health (members of  
the executive committes) decided that the current policy of  not 
using AZT would continue and that the use of  Nevirapine, once 
registered, would first be tested for two years at two pilot sites 
in every province.  The reason for this was:
  “to determine whether or not the exercise would be feasible, 
taking into account all the operational issues.  Should the 
pilot sites be successful, the next step would be phased 
implementation; should this not be possible the exercise 
would be terminated.”
147.   This approach ignored the ethical and constitutional obligation 
to provide Nevirapine to women who already knew they were 
HIV-positive.  It meant that even where a woman knew she was 
HIV-positive, knew of  the potential effects of  Nevirapine and 
wanted to take the drug, if  she gave birth at a place other than 
a pilot site, she was not allowed to use the drug.  
148.   In April 2002, after substantial delays apparently due to 
significant political interference, the MCC finally formally 
registered Nevirapine for the prevention of  intrapartum 
transmission.  
149.   This removed the last obstacle to legal action. The TAC decided 
that both morally and politically it had no option other than to 
launch a case against the government.  The TAC was able to elicit 
the support of  some of  the most experienced constitutional 
lawyers in the country, whose commitment and professionalism 
were central to the success of  the case. 
Politics and mobilisation
150.   In essence, the TAC’s challenge related to public health policy. 
It should have been managed by the government as a legitimate 
challenge, envisaged and encouraged by the Constitution, 
similar for example to the Soobramoney case.  But it was not.  
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151.   Throughout this period, the denialists’ AIDS policy was under 
fierce attack and the policy on Nevirapine – being essentially 
a manifestation of  the president’s AIDS policy – was fiercely 
defended.  There also appeared to be political interference in 
the case – particularly apparent in pressure brought to bear on 
the South African Human Rights Commission to withdraw its 
application to enter as amicus curiae in the case in support of  
the TAC.
152.   The TAC, however, was prepared for the politics that surrounded 
the case. It believed that the MTCT policy was based upon a 
political decision taken at the highest level of  government. 
The TAC’s constitution empowers it to engage in litigation as a 
means of  challenging “any type of  discrimination relating to the 
treatment of  HIV/AIDS in the private and public sector”   .This 
allows it to take legal action to enforce any right that is explicitly 
recognised in the Constitution. The reference to litigation in the 
TAC’s constitution occurs in the same paragraph as a reference 
to “lobbying, advocacy and all forms of  legitimate social 
mobilisation”. 
153.    For the TAC, litigation both emerges from and feeds back into 
a social context. Resort to litigation is not exclusive of  other 
strategies.  Litigation can also help catalyse mobilisation and 
assist public education on contested issues, as well as bring 
about direct relief  to individuals or classes of  applicants.  Thus, 
between August and December 2001, the TAC engaged in 
intensive public mobilisation, attracting enormous support and 
media interest.
154.   However, support within the TAC for a litigation strategy could 
not be taken for granted. Internally numerous workshops 
were conducted with the TAC volunteers to explain the case. 
Externally, and among some of  TAC’s main allies, particularly 
the Congress of  South African Trade Unions (COSATU), there 
was a reluctance publicly to endorse taking “our” government 
to court. The right of  civil society to use litigation to claim and 
enforce rights had to be argued in meetings and workshops 
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Crossroads, Cape Town, 2007: former state president Nelson Mandela engages with 
HIV-positive children
Pic: Ruvan Boshoff
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against those who considered it “disloyal” or “unpatriotic”. 
Although COSATU welcomed each judgment in the TAC’s favour, 
it never openly supported the litigation.
155.   Mobilisation culminated on 25 and 26 November 2001, when 
rallies and marches took place around South Africa, including 
an all-night vigil of  600 TAC volunteers outside the court before 
the hearing on Nevirapine commenced.  For the two days of  
the hearing, the court was packed with people wearing TAC’s 
trademark “HIV-Positive” T-shirt, health professionals and 
journalists, listening intently to the evolution of  the argument.  
156.   The urgency of  the case seemed to be understood by Judge 
Botha, who handed down his judgment to a tense and expectant 
court on 14 December 2001.  On all the key issues, the High 
Court found in favour of  the TAC, commenting that in the 
government’s arguments: 
  “There was no unqualified commitment to reach the rest of 
the population in any given time or at any given rate . . . a 
programme that is open-ended and that leaves everything 
to the future cannot be said to be coherent, progressive and 
purposeful.”  
  Botha declared that “a countrywide MTCT programme is an 
ineluctable obligation of the state”.
157.   The High Court’s order was bold and original.  It instructed 
the government to allow Nevirapine to be prescribed where 
it was “medically indicated” and where, in the opinion of  the 
doctors acting in consultation with the medical superintendent, 
there was capacity to do so.  The High Court also ordered the 
government to develop “an effective comprehensive national 
programme to prevent or reduce MTCT” and to return to the 
court with this programme for further scrutiny before 31 March 
2002.  The High Court judgment was welcomed in South Africa 
and worldwide.  The acclaim, however, was not universal.  In 
South Africa, it attracted the ire not only of  the government but 
also of  a number of  legal academics, one of  whom declared it 
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Durban,  March 2002: a demonstration was organised by the Treatment Action Campaign 
demanding that HIV-positive mothers be treated with the highly effective anti-AIDS drug,  
Nevirapine,  to prevent the virus being passed on to their unborn children
Pic: Richard Shorey
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February 2008: President Thabo Mbeki opens Parliament in Cape Town. Mbeki’s AIDS 
denialism has held up the public health system’s roll-out of ARVs to treat people with  HIV/
AIDS. Mbeki’s stance has forced NPOs to take the government to court on numerous occasions 
and has contributed to the rising rate of deaths from AIDS
Pic: Trevor Samson  
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a case of  “when judges go too far”. The accusation now arose 
that the High Court had breached the principle of  separation 
of  powers between judiciary and executive by interfering in 
health policy and ordering the government to supply a specific 
medicine.  Thus, on 18 December 2001, when the minister of  
Health announced that she would seek leave to appeal directly to 
the Constitutional Court, it was claimed that the appeal was: 
  “aimed at clarifying a constitutional and jurisdictional matter 
which, if left vague, could throw executive policymaking 
into disarray and create confusion about the principle of 
the separation of powers, which is a cornerstone of our 
democracy”.
The political and legal unravelling of the government’s 
case 
158.   When President Mbeki opened Parliament in February 2002, he 
appeared to shift government policy by promising that:
  “continuing work will be done to monitor the efficacy 
of antiretroviral interventions against mother-to-child 
transmission in the sites already operational and any new 
ones that may be decided upon”.  
  A few days later this shift seemed to be confirmed in a live 
television interview when President Mbeki explicitly stated 
that provinces should be able to provide an MTCT programme 
according to their respective capacities and that “provinces with 
the resources to extend the programme should not be delayed 
by provinces that did not have the resources”.  
159.   This new approach appears to have been read by a number 
of  senior ANC politicians as condoning the rollout of  the 
programme to health facilities where capacity existed or could 
easily be created. In particular on 18 February 2002, the ANC 
Premier of  Gauteng Mbhazima Shilowa announced a bold 
rollout of  the programme.  He promised that “during the next 
financial year, we will ensure that all public hospitals and our 
large community health centres will provide Nevirapine”. He 
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also named nine further hospitals that would commence the 
programme within the next 100 days.
160.   However, once again falling foul of  public opinion and her own 
department – which had initially claimed that the Gauteng rollout 
was within the parameters set by the Health MinMEC – the 
minister of  health publicly rebuked Shilowa. Although Shilowa 
gave the impression of  backing down, after a behind-the-scenes 
meeting, his programme continued. By October 2002, he was 
in a position to announce that Nevirapine was available at 70 
per cent of  all health facilities in Gauteng province.  
161.   During this period, politics and law developed an interesting 
dialectic.  The pressure of  the ongoing legal action forced the 
government back into court, and the different stages of  the appeal 
and application for execution order further spurred advocacy 
and social mobilisation – which in turn placed new pressures on 
the government.  At its national executive committee in January 
2002 and in discussion with its legal team, the TAC had decided 
to embark on an offensive in response to the appeal and to 
return to the Pretoria High Court to seek an order of  execution 
on the part of  the judgment that instructed that Nevirapine be 
made available where capacity existed.  The justification for this 
action was that it could save up to ten lives a day during the 
period in which legal processes around the appeal took place 
– approximately six months.  Outside and inside the court, the 
TAC argued that this approach was validated by developments 
in the political arena, such as Mbeki’s “State of  the Nation” 
address and the extension of  the programme in Gauteng and 
KwaZulu-Natal.
162.   On 1 March 2002, demonstrations took place at the Pretoria 
High Court during the hearing of  the government’s application 
for leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court and the TAC’s 
application for an execution order, which were heard together. 
Ten days later, on 11 March 2002, another judgment was handed 
down in favour of  the TAC.  In this judgment the High Court 
granted the execution order, drawing attention to the TAC’s 
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argument that up to ten lives a day could be saved by execution 
of  orders 1 and 2, which “is not denied” by the government.
163.   Inexplicably, the government decided to seek leave to appeal 
against this judgment directly to the Constitutional Court. 
In response, the TAC’s legal team quickly filed a counter-
application arguing that the government’s main purpose for 
further legal action was solely to stultify the execution order. 
New legal issues arose as to whether interlocutory orders could 
be appealed.  The matter was heard on 22 March 2002 and 
judgment was handed down three days later.
164.   In the days immediately before the hearing, the government 
had taken advantage of  the decision by Boehringer Ingelheim to 
withdraw its application to the US Food & Drug Administration 
for the registration of  Nevirapine for preventing intrapartum 
HIV transmission.  Inside (and outside) court, the government 
cast this development as a safety issue, justifying its caution in 
making the medicine more widely available.  However, the High 
Court saw this argument as a red herring, pointing out that if  
the registration of  Nevirapine was withdrawn, it would apply to 
all uses of  the drug, including at the government pilot sites.  
165.   During this time, it seemed as if  sensible legal advice to the 
government was the last thing driving its case.  It was as if  
a nerve has been touched and had triggered an irrational 
response that took everything to the extreme, regardless of  
public perceptions, lives lost or the cost of  ongoing legal action. 
Thus, on 26 March 2002, one day after the Pretoria High Court 
had dismissed the attempt to appeal the execution order, the 
government launched a further and final application for leave 
to appeal – this time directly to the Constitutional Court.  The 
application was heard on 3 April 2002 by the Constitutional 
Court.  
A strategic evaluation of public interest litigation in South Africa
86
Section
2
Three Case studies of public interest litigation
Cape Town, 2007: A Treatment Action Campaign demonstration: the TAC has held the 
government’s feet to the fi re, through a combination of on-the-ground mobilisation, 
innovative advocacy and litigation 
Pic: Treatment Action Campaign
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166.   In the court of  public opinion, the government’s various 
appeals were lambasted by political cartoonists and newspaper 
editorials.  They were also a failure of  legal strategy.  Although 
the legal issues the Constitutional Court had to decide in the 
latest appeal were narrow and different from those it would 
consider in the main appeal, they could not be decided without 
considering the broader issues, including the rationality of  
the MTCT policy.  The result was that the government itself  
created a situation where the issues of  the case were aired in 
the Constitutional Court a month before the date set for the full 
appeal.  
167.   During the hearing, the Constitutional Court judges appeared to 
be at a loss as to why the government was so fiercely opposed 
to the execution order. Not surprisingly, on 4 April 2002 the 
Constitutional Court refused the government leave to appeal 
against the order of  execution. 
Constitutional advocacy on the streets and in court
168.   On 17 April 2002 – two weeks before the main appeal hearing 
in the Constitutional Court – the Cabinet took South Africa and 
the world by surprise by releasing a statement on HIV/AIDS 
that, among other things, promised “a universal rollout plan to 
be completed as soon as possible, in preparation for the post-
December 2002 period”. For the first time, the Cabinet publicly 
acknowledged that antiretroviral drug treatments: 
  “could help improve the conditions of people living with AIDS 
if administered at certain stages in the progression of the 
condition, in accordance with international standards”.
169.   Against this backdrop, the TAC mobilised for the last leg of  the 
case – to be heard in the Constitutional Court.  A decision was 
taken to rally “stand-up for your rights” marches on the first 
day of  the Constitutional Court hearing and demonstrations 
were prepared in Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban. In 
Johannesburg, over 5 000 people marched to the Constitutional 
Court in support of  the TAC.
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170.   On 2 May 2002, the Constitutional Court was filled with activists, 
doctors, nurses and the media.  Three months later, on 5 July 
2002, the judgments in the TAC case and related matters were 
handed down.  
171.   Unanimously, the Constitutional Court decided that the 
government’s policy had not met its constitutional obligations to 
provide people with access to health care services in a manner 
that was reasonable and took account of  pressing social needs. 
Drawing on its own prior judgments and foreign jurisprudence, 
the court confirmed the judiciary’s right to issue instructions 
to the government to amend policies where these were found 
to be unconstitutional.  The judgment also insisted on the 
court’s right to “ensure that effective relief  is granted” and to 
exercise “supervisory jurisdiction”.  Without contradicting the 
High Court, the court stopped short of  setting time frames for 
the government on the basis that it accepted the bona fides 
of  commitments made by the government whose policy was 
no longer as rigid as it was when proceedings commenced. 
Instead, it ordered the government “without delay” to:
 “(a)  Remove the restrictions that prevent Nevirapine from 
being made available for the purpose of reducing the risk 
of mother-to-child transmission of HIV at public hospitals 
and clinics that are not research and training sites.
 “(b)   Permit and facilitate the use of Nevirapine for the purpose 
of reducing the risk of mother-to-child transmission of 
HIV and to make it available for this purpose at hospitals 
and clinics when in the judgment of the attending 
medical practitioner acting in consultation with the 
medical superintendent of the facility concerned this is 
medically indicated, which shall if necessary include that 
the mother concerned has been appropriately tested and 
counselled.
 “(c)   Make provision, if necessary, for counsellors based at 
public hospitals and clinics other than the research and 
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training sites, to be trained for the counselling necessary 
for the use of Nevirapine to reduce the risk of mother-to-
child transmission of HIV.  
 (d)  Take reasonable measures to extend the testing and 
counselling of facilities at hospitals and clinics throughout 
the public health sector to facilitate and expedite the use of 
Nevirapine for the purpose of reducing the risk of mother-
to-child transmission of HIV.”
172.   Ironically, in light of  the April Cabinet resolution, this was 
arguably a more intrusive order than that of  the High Court. 
Time frames and an instruction to return to court were replaced 
with instructions requiring immediate action.  Despite this, 
some observers have argued that, given the life and death nature 
of  the human rights issue and the history of  the government’s 
conduct in the case, a supervisory order was both justified and 
necessary.  They argued that such an order would make it easier 
to monitor and oversee compliance. 
Conclusion and Follow-up
173.   The judgment of  the Constitutional Court did not end the 
disputes over the provision of  MTCT services.  After it was 
handed down, pressure continued to be necessary to ensure 
provinces complied with the court order.  The TAC held meetings 
with MECs in the three least compliant provinces, the Director-
General of  the Health Department and the Deputy-President of  
South Africa. 
174.   In September 2002, the TAC took a decision to launch rolling 
contempt of  court proceedings against individual provinces, 
and this decision was communicated to the Director-General. 
This triggered government’s first serious attempt to provide 
the TAC with the information that the Constitutional Court held 
it was under a duty to make available.  The information was 
inadequate, but reflected a creeping compliance that benefited 
parents and children.  For example, on 16 October 2002, an 
email was received from a doctor in Limpopo Province saying 
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2002: Former president Nelson Mandela shows solidarity with Zackie Achmat, chair of the 
Treatment Action Campaign. At the time Achmat had full-blown AIDS but was refusing to 
take antiretrovirals until they were accessible to all through the public health service
Pic: Treatment Action Campaign
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that the Provincial Health Department had “at long last” given 
  “permission for the implementation of  the PMTCT programme. 
I think this was due to pressure from the TAC/courts initiative 
came from their side this time and they seem to be in quite a 
hurry to get the programme up and running.”
175.   As we discuss in the remainder of  this report, the TAC 
case demonstrates almost perfectly how to combine social 
mobilisation on the one hand, with litigation on the other.  It 
is without doubt a shining example as to how litigation – when 
run properly and as part of  a series of  broader strategies – can 
achieve social change.
176.   However, the one aspect of  the TAC case that was, in retrospect, 
inadequate was its follow-up after the court victory. This is 
notwithstanding the efforts referred to above. The deficiencies 
in follow-up and their effect are well explained by Berger:
  “Perhaps because of its high profile work regarding the 
implementation of the public sector ARV treatment programme 
– which owes its existence in large part to the court victory 
– many people believe that  the TAC has continually monitored 
the implementation of [the judgment], putting pressure on 
government to comply with the order.  Given the detail of 
the order granted by the Constitutional Court, in some ways 
perhaps dispensing with the need for a structural interdict, it 
should have been possible for an organisation of the TAC’s size 
and strength to do what is clearly required to ensure effective 
implementation.  But this did not happen.  Despite recognising 
the importance of the issue in the case, the organisation’s 
focus was largely on the bigger picture, seeing TAC as an entry 
point to develop the right to health in general and access to 
ARV treatment in particular.  The TAC admits that it was a 
mistake to take its eye off the ball.  Its current programme 
of action thus focusses attention on improving on the state’s 
MTCT prevention programme.”
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  Berger adds that:
  “Had this work happened earlier, the drug regimen used in 
the PMTCT programme may have been improved – in line 
with current World Health Organization guidelines.  Certainly, 
coverage of the programme, uptake and its linkages with the 
ARV treatment programme, would in all likelihood have been 
better.”
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Pic: supplied Treatment Action Campaign
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Four key strategies for 
social change
177.  Drawing from the three case studies mentioned as well as our 
evaluation as whole, we have concluded that for public interest 
litigation to achieve maximum success in advancing social 
change and achieving social mobilisation, it must take place in 
combination with three other strategies.  These are:
 177.1.  Conducting public information campaigns to achieve 
rights awareness;
 177.2.  Providing advice and assistance to persons in claiming 
their rights; and
 177.3.  Making use of  social mobilisation and advocacy to ensure 
that communities are actively involved in asserting rights 
inside and outside the legal environment.
178.   We do not suggest that it is essential that a single organisation 
itself  be integrally involved in each of  these four strategies. 
Indeed, often this is not possible and we readily accept that there 
is a vital role to be played by specialist litigation organisations. 
179.   However, it is critical that if  particular organisations do not 
themselves engage in the three other strategies mentioned, 
they should at least operate together with other organisations 
that do engage in these other strategies.  As one respondent put 
it:
  “The ’successful’ combination is not a paint-by-numbers one, 
but very much depends on the issue. However, the history of 
social change has proven many times over that a single action 
strategy – whether litigation on its own, or activism on its own, 
will always fail.”
STRATEGY 1 – PUBLIC INFORMATION
180.   A public information campaign that informs ordinary people of  
their rights is an essential component of  any effort to achieve 
social mobilisation on rights issues. 
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October 2003: The right to education is enshrined in the Constitution. Sisters Manoko and 
Elizabeth Dolo were unable to attend school near Mokopane in Limpopo province because 
their mother could not afford school fees for all her seven children. In some parts of the 
country, NPOs have now managed to secure a waiver of schools fees by taking legal action 
Pic: Sydney Seshibedi
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181.  When asked about the major obstacles to using the law to 
achieve social change, virtually every respondent identified lack 
of  knowledge about rights as the primary obstacle.  As one 
respondent explained:
  “Few of the poor and marginalised (especially those in rural 
areas that lack access to information and communication 
technology) are aware of their rights, know the law, or have 
been informed that the law may be able to help change their 
situation.”
182.  Another respondent made the same point with regard to 
expanding the use of  socio-economic rights: 
  “The first step necessary to achieve this expansion is the 
creation of a system wherein the people know their rights and 
begin to assert them. This empowerment of the citizenry will 
necessitate capacity building of grassroots organisations, so 
that these groups may develop the skills needed to educate 
people about their rights and assist them in situations where 
their rights are being violated.”
183.   A public information campaign is valuable in itself  in terms 
of  changing attitudes and empowering individuals.  But it is 
also essential if  people are to understand the role that law and 
legal rights can play in achieving social change.  A number of  
respondents suggested that, somewhat surprisingly, even certain 
well-organised bodies, such as some trade unions, are currently 
insufficiently aware or persuaded of  the role that legal rights 
could play in assisting them to achieve their goals.  In respect 
of  ordinary citizens and communities, the lack of  knowledge is 
far more severe.
184.   The need for public information is brought home forcefully by 
the example of  the Grootboom case.  In Grootboom, until the 
magistrate of  his own accord referred the community to a lawyer, 
they apparently had no idea that they had legal rights which 
might be available to assist them in preventing the eviction.  
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  As a result, they did not even seek legal advice of  their own 
accord – let alone make adequate use of  the legal rights that 
they had.
185.   This is true of  many areas of  South African life where statutes or 
the Constitution confer rights on people, but they are unaware of  
these rights and therefore cannot make use of  them.  This is so 
even when the rights are explicit and contained in legislation.  
 185.1.    For example, one respondent emphasised that 
although the South African Schools Act provides 
substantial protection for children whose parents 
have not paid their school fees, the majority of  
families who have had their children threatened or 
sent home from school due to unpaid fees do not 
know they have any legal recourse.
 185.2.    Another example is the fact that some municipalities 
have “indigency policies” that allow poor persons 
to obtain free or reduced rate municipal services, 
such as electricity and water.  However, the 
municipalities appear to have made no effort to 
alert consumers to this and, as a result, consumers 
are simply unaware of  this route as an option. 
The indigency policies remain in by-laws only, with 
poor people having their electricity and water cut 
off  due to non-payment.
186.   The kind of  public information required is demonstrated by 
the TAC example.  The TAC has engaged in extensive public 
information campaigns, both directed at its own members 
and the general public, explaining what the rights of  HIV-
positive persons are.  Moreover, as the case study discussion 
demonstrates, this public information campaign continued 
even after the litigation had been launched – with numerous 
workshops conducted by TAC volunteers to explain the case.  
187.   Such strategies are crucial for ensuring the success of  public 
interest litigation.  If  ordinary persons do not understand and 
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November 2006: Shallcross, near Durban: parents protest against the imposition of school 
fees, which are keeping their children out of primary school
Pic: Abhi Indrarajan
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buy in to the litigation, those conducting the public interest 
litigation are unable to obtain the required information to launch 
a successful litigation and are unlikely to generate substantial 
support from ordinary persons in which in turn plays an 
important role in perceptions of  the litigation by courts, the 
public and the government.
188.   Moreover, where the litigation succeeds, it is essential that 
people are aware of  the success in order to pursue their rights, 
to transform the victory into concrete progress on the ground, 
and to inform the public interest organisation if  the victory, for 
whatever reason, is not leading to tangible social change on the 
ground.
STRATEGY 2 - ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE
189.   Once people are aware of  their rights, it is critical that a strategy 
enabling them to claim these rights is developed.  
190.   Of  course, all public interest litigation is notionally about 
enabling people to claim their rights. However, we conclude that 
something beyond this – and separate from it – is necessary. 
Litigation cannot and should not be the only way in which 
persons are enabled to claim their rights. 
191.   Instead, it is essential that there are intermediary organisations 
which enable people to claim their rights, through giving advice, 
directing them to the appropriate institutions, assisting them 
with the formulation of  their claims, and taking matters up on 
their behalf  – all of  which can be done successfully without 
necessarily engaging in litigation.
192.   The need for such “advice centres” is made clear by the efforts 
of  public interest organisations under apartheid.  A number of  
respondents emphasised the important role played by “advice 
offices” in this period.  This meant that organisations such 
as the Black Sash, which did not undertake litigation, could 
nevertheless provide legal assistance to large numbers of  
people and channel cases that required litigation to members 
in private practice. 
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2007: Bloemhof, North West province: an advice offi ce affi liated to the Association of 
University Legal Aid Institutions (AULAI). It serves a largely poor,  rural community
Pic: AULAI
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193.  The difficulty is that, with a few notable exceptions, such advice 
offices have now dwindled.  This means that either poor people 
must access fully fledged lawyers or, for the most part, they 
are left without any legal advice at all. As one respondent 
explained: 
  “Access to litigation options remains very limited, and the 
linkages between frontline remedial options (i.e. advice 
centres) and equipped legal service practitioners remain 
acutely limited.”
194.   The advice centres in question need not be staffed by lawyers. 
Many of  the issues raised may not even need legal advice.   In 
many instances persons simply do not know where to go to 
claim a service from a particular government department or do 
not know the services to which they are entitled.   Proper advice 
on these issues could mean a significant change in people’s lives 
without a lawyer’s letter ever being written – let alone litigation 
being launched.
195.  As one respondent who runs such advice centres explained:
  “Of the 10 000 cases we see per year, only a small portion 
require the assistance of a pro bono attorney.  Still fewer form 
part of test cases seeking to change the law.”
196.   However, it is also important that the centres either be staffed 
by paralegals or at least have persons sufficiently trained to see 
what legal routes are available.  This would assist in ensuring 
access to justice given that, at present, there is no government 
system for legal aid in civil cases due to the fact that the Legal 
Aid Board focusses almost entirely on criminal matters.  
197.   It was for this reason that had the Grootboom community not 
been referred by the magistrate to Julian Appollos, they would 
likely have been left unrepresented and entirely unable to resist 
the eviction.  While the magistrate’s actions in this regard must 
of  course be applauded, he was under no duty to refer. This 
demonstrates the valuable role to be played by providing advice 
and assistance to persons wishing to assert their rights. 
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198.   The advice centres could thus play a fundamentally important role 
in, where necessary, referring persons to litigation organisations. 
In doing so they would provide an essential feeding ground for 
future litigation – by identifying the core issues that are affecting 
large numbers of  ordinary persons most seriously.  This allows 
public interest litigation to be effectively designed and targeted 
to achieve maximum impact, and also provides a wide range of  
possible plaintiffs/applicants to participate in the litigation and 
sustain the factual contentions necessary to make the litigation 
successful.
199.   Equally importantly, such advice centres can play a crucial 
role in ensuring that a substantial victory in a landmark case 
actually translates into tangible benefits far beyond those 
directly involved in the case. A victory on social grants in the 
Constitutional Court is meaningless if  there are advice centres 
to disseminate the news of  the victory and, where necessary, to 
write letters reminding the relevant department of  the decision 
and its effect.  The advice and assistance strategy is therefore 
essential, if  we are to avoid having jurisprudentially important 
cases that have little practical impact on the ground.
200.   As one respondent explained, in answer to the question of  how 
poor and marginalised communities have used the law to access 
rights and services:
  “They have used the law very effectively when they have access 
to advice offices, LRC and other free legal services.  But the 
major problem is access.”
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2007: North West province: a rural legal advice offi ce affi liated to the Association of 
University Legal Aid Institutions (AULAI)
Pic: AULAI
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STRATEGY 3 - SOCIAL MOBILISATION AND ADVOCACY 
201.   It is clear from our evaluation that rights generally are most 
effectively asserted by social movements.  This point is well-
demonstrated by the three case studies to which we have 
referred, as well as other examples, and is a view shared by 
virtually every respondent in our evaluation.
202.   Importantly, it appears that this conclusion is not limited to 
South Africa.  Instead, the comparative foreign experience 
demonstrates the same trend, a point emphasised by Geoff  
Budlender in his piece “Using the South African Constitution as 
a Mechanism for Addressing Poverty” (unpublished, 2000) on 
which we draw here.
 202.1    The view that litigation by itself  is generally 
insufficient to produce social change and that social 
mobilisation is essential, has been particularly 
forcefully expressed in the Indian context.  As 
former Chief  Justice P.N. Bhagwati of  the Supreme 
Court of  India expresses it:
       “We must always remember that social action 
litigation is a necessary and valuable ally in the 
cause of the poor, but it cannot be a substitute 
for the organisation of the poor, development of 
community self-reliance and establishment of 
effective organisational structures through which 
the poor can combat exploitation and injustice, 
protect and defend their interests, and secure 
their rights and entitlements.”
       Quoted in Jeremy Cooper “Public Interest Law 
Revisited” (1999) 25 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 
15 at 140
 202.2    The same point is made even more forcefully by an 
Indian public interest litigation activist:
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       “For the downtrodden of the world, we secure their 
rights by law, exactly as though they had the same 
privileged background as we, and then, outside the 
courtroom we leave them to their separate ways 
. . .  Their grim, hostile world, which recedes while 
we are present, returns with a vengeance.  This is 
why our legal victories turn out to be pyrrhic and 
dangerous to the poor.  There is a real danger if 
legal activists continue to interfere haphazardly, 
on a short-term, case-wise basis with the lives of 
the downtrodden.  It is time we learn that it is not 
enough to expose the innumerable and appalling 
social evils through the courts and the media.  We 
must link up with social activists who alone can 
provide them with ground support.”
       Vasudha Dhagamwar quoted in Jeremy Cooper “Public 
Interest Law Revisited” (1999) 25 Commonwealth 
Law Bulletin 15 at 139
 202.3    Indeed, it must be recognised that the use of  
litigation may even distract from and undermine 
other activities of  a social movement which seek 
to enforce rights.  As Richard Abel explains:
       “The legal representation of similarly situated 
individuals, even when it takes the form of a ‘class’ 
action, tends to substitute for, rather than foster, 
organisation . . .  The inescapable conclusions, 
however reluctant we may be to draw them, are 
that the clientele of legal aid does not lend 
itself to organisation, and that the offer of legal 
assistance actually may undermine collective 
action.”
       Richard Abel “Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under 
Advanced Capitalism” (1985) 32 UCLA Law Review 
474 at 496-7
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203.   Almost precisely the same view is expressed by a respondent in 
this evaluation:
  “The potential exists for litigation and mobilisation to be in 
tension, if recourse to the courts leads to resources being 
devoted only to litigation, at the expense of other strategies, 
leading to demobilisation. This can also involve lawyers 
and intellectuals taking the lead in devising strategies and 
making key decisions, at the expense of decision-making by 
communities or their representatives. This danger needs to be 
guarded against.”
204.   Major debates around these issues took place in South Africa 
within the labour movement in the 1980s.  As is made clear by 
the relative unwillingness of  COSATU to actively support the 
TAC case, an issue discussed in Section 2, it appears that the 
suspicion held of  law in this regard has not entirely dissipated.
205.   What all of  this makes clear is that making use of  litigation 
can never suffice as an alternative to or substitute for proper 
social mobilisation on rights issues.  Rights have to be asserted 
both outside and inside the courts.  Laws and policies have 
to be developed in a manner which has proper regard to the 
rights.  Even when there is litigation which results in a major 
breakthrough, there has to be organisation to ensure that it is 
properly implemented.  
206.  It is therefore critical that public interest litigation be seen as 
merely one facet – albeit an important one – of  broader, more 
varied efforts to achieve social mobilisation and change.  In 
particular, public interest litigation achieves maximum social 
impact when it complements and assists other advocacy 
strategies, including efforts to achieve social change via 
the formal and informal political process as well as public 
pressure. 
207.   As Geoff  Budlender explains, what is needed is some form of  
social movement :
 “to identify issues, mobilise support around them, place   
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  pressure on the political system, use the legal system as a 
means of achieving this, and monitor and enforce favourable 
laws and orders by the courts.  The best legal work supports 
the development of this sort of social movement.”
  Geoff Budlender, “Using the South African Constitution as a 
Mechanism for Addressing Poverty” (unpublished, 2000)
208.   This is made particularly clear by the TAC case as it set out in 
detail in Section 2 of  this report.  The TAC saw its litigation as 
one facet of  its much bigger political fight over the availability 
of  AIDS drugs and for years before the case commenced, the 
TAC had been engaging in substantial social mobilisation of  its 
members and the broader public in an effort to put pressure on 
the government.
209.   Geoff  Budlender makes this point concisely and convincingly:
  “The TAC built a strong alliance with key pillars of civil society 
– trade unions, churches and media. It built a genuine social 
movement and showed how the Constitution, which represents 
the best ideals and values of our country, can be a powerful 
tool for holding government to those ideals and values.
  “In some ways, the final judgment of the Constitutional Court 
was simply the conclusion of a battle that the TAC had already 
won outside the courts, but with the skilful use of the courts 
as part of a broader struggle.”
  Geoff Budlender “A Paper Dog With Real Teeth” Mail & Guardian 12 
July 2002
210.   It is not only organisations on the scale of  the TAC that have 
succeeded in using social mobilisation effectively, with litigation 
as one component of  a much larger overall plan.  Over the past 
two years, a group of  artisanal (subsistence) fishermen have 
been placed under grave threat by the enactment of  the Marine 
Living Resources Act 18 of  1998 and related fishing quotas.
 210.1    In response, they embarked on a range of  advocacy 
and lobbying activities including numerous letters 
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and memoranda to the ministry and Presidency, 
meetings with officials, marches on Parliament, 
the chaining of  leaders to the gates of  Parliament, 
a hunger strike and vigil, and building strong 
alliances with other stakeholders in civil society.   
 210.2    In addition, litigation attacking the relevant policies 
was launched against the Minister of  Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism.
 210.3    The litigation was ultimately settled out of  court 
on terms favourable to the fishermen, but social 
mobilisation was key to this outcome.
211.   These examples should be contrasted with the Grootboom case 
and the gay and lesbian litigation.
212.   In the Grootboom case, there was initially active social 
mobilisation and protest. 
 212.1    As is set out in more detail in Section 2 of  this 
report, a few days after being evicted, the 
community organised a march to the offices of  the 
municipality, forced their way into a council meeting 
and demanded that something be done about their 
plight.  This ultimately did not secure them any 
assistance – although it did put them in contact 
with the ANC politician who later encouraged them 
to launch the court action.
 212.2   However, once the litigation began, the social 
mobilisation appeared to dissipate, with the 
community relying largely on the legal process to 
resolve the dispute. This had a number of  negative 
effects, including that by the time judgment was 
handed down, the community was no longer in a 
strong position actively to assert and enforce its 
rights. 
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 212.3   The weak and temporary nature of  the social 
mobilisation in the Grootboom case is, regrettably, 
symptomatic of  a lack of  mobilisation in the 
land and housing sectors more generally.  As one 
respondent explained of  the land sector:
       “The key weakness in South Africa’s land sector 
to date has clearly been the lack of an organised 
political constituency in rural society, articulating 
a powerful rural voice able to counter the 
persistent urban bias in the country’s politics and 
economics.  Land sector NGOs have consistently 
advocated pro-poor policies and greater levels of 
state investment in rural areas, but their reach is 
limited and their impact on policy has been uneven 
and often very limited. Rural social movements 
pushing for fundamental change did not emerge 
on any scale in the 1990s, and an attempt in 
1999 to foster such a movement, undertaken by 
an alliance of NGOs under the umbrella of the 
Rural Development Initiative came to naught.”
 212.4.    This may well explain why the land and housing 
cases brought thus far under the Constitution have 
all related to individual communities, often faced 
with an immediate threat of  eviction.  This in stark 
contrast to the careful strategy of  the TAC.
213.   In respect of  the gay and lesbian litigation, the National 
Coalition was initially very active and effective at lobbying at a 
political level and at ensuring a public presence, for example at 
the court hearings that took place in the sodomy matter.  This 
public presence waned over time, though it was revived to some 
extent briefly by the gay marriage case and its aftermath.
 213..1    However, respondents in the gay and lesbian 
sector made clear to us that the lack of  social 
mobilisation and public engagement on gay and 
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lesbian issues was a major problem for the sector, 
notwithstanding the string of  emphatic court 
victories.
 213.2    As one respondent in the gay and lesbian sector 
explained:
       “Litigation strategies must be coupled with 
community-based activism and popularisation 
of legal advocacy to allow a deepening of public 
engagement with the issue of socio-economic 
rights.  Rights are not only won through the courts, 
for they are only as lasting and meaningful as 
the extent to which they can be accessed.  In our 
sector, an over-reliance of legal means to facilitate 
social change has meant that we now have a large 
gap between the policy and the personal reality, 
on a range of rights issues.”
 213.3   The respondent continued: 
       “The LGBT sector has largely won its gains 
through the courts, with little engagement with 
affected constituencies or the broader public. 
The disparity that exists between law change and 
practical outcomes this will affect, is glaring. 
Implementation is key and the human factor 
mediates here, so unless we engage with the 
social attitudes and perceptions that make up this 
human factor, the effects of law in action will be 
limited. Administrative barriers are key here, and 
civil society organisations and service providers 
have a critical role to play.”
 213.4   It is thus clear that even in the gay and lesbian 
litigation – which we have argued was as carefully 
thought-out and well-run as any other litigation 
strategy of  which we are aware – this is not sufficient 
to compensate for the lack of  social mobilisation.
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214.   The lack of  mobilisation is even more stark in other areas 
– particularly and unsurprisingly those involving individual 
litigants.  Thus, for example, there have been a series of  
decisions by the courts in favour of  individual women who have 
been subjected to violence and abuse by the police or due to 
state inaction, for example: Carmichele v Minister of  Safety and 
Security and Another 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) and K v Minister of  
Safety and Security 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC).  
215.   These were landmark and path-breaking judgments which held 
the state accountable and awarded substantial damages.  But 
as one respondent asked, “Where has this had any impact on 
the way in which ordinary women are treated in general or by 
the state in particular?”  While the judgments and monetary 
damages may have vindicated the rights of  the individual women 
concerned, they appear to have little impact on this broader 
scale. 
216.   The same lesson appears from litigation under apartheid.  Though 
the legal and political environment was substantially different 
from the present, an examination of  Rick Abel’s excellent work 
Politics by Other Means: Law in the Struggle Against Apartheid, 
1980-1994 (1995) makes clear that legal work under apartheid 
was most likely to be successful in an enduring way when it was 
supported by political or social movements or organisations, to 
the extent then possible.
217.   The lesson in our view is clear – it is the combination of  social 
mobilisation and litigation that has the greatest potential to 
alter laws and policies.  These are complementary strategies. 
As one respondent urged:
  “Civil society in South Africa could make greater use of a 
combination of strategies for social change that includes 
litigation as one key component, and that might even 
involve using litigation as an entry point for large-scale 
mobilisation.”
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218.   We have some doubts, however, about this latter suggestion 
that litigation can be used as an entry point for large-scale 
mobilisation.
219.   On the one hand, there can be no question that the TAC case 
vastly increased the public profile of  the TAC and assisted in 
widening the mobilisation process.  Nevertheless, it is important 
to bear in mind that, at least on a smaller level, the TAC used a 
model of  mobilise first, litigation second.
220.   Moreover, another respondent doubted that litigation could 
produce mobilisation:
  “Litigation can only catalyse mobilisation that is already taking 
place, it cannot create a movement where there was none.”  
221.   While much will depend on the specific circumstances of  the 
organisation, community and cause at issue, we are of  the 
view that for many communities and organisations, until there 
is sufficient mobilisation, litigation will not even be a possible 
option. This is demonstrated by the Grootboom example.
 221.1    In Grootboom, as is described in more detail in 
Section 2 of  this report, the community’s decision 
to embark on legal action only occurred when 
the prominent ANC provincial politician became 
involved and supported such a course, thinking it 
would assist the ANC to embarrass the NNP.  Until 
then litigation was not on the agenda – even though 
the community was now legally represented.
 221.2    This suggests strongly that the litigation may not 
have happened in the same way or at all had the 
community (generally strong ANC supporters) not 
been spurred on by the ANC politician and had 
the primary target not been the NNP-run local 
municipality.  
222.   A similar issue is raised by the TAC case.  There, as Heywood 
explains, there was considerable reluctance on the part of  
COSATU to identify with litigation against the government:
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  “[T]here was reluctance publicly to endorse taking ‘our’ 
government to court.  Therefore the right of civil society to 
use litigation to claim and enforce rights had to be argued 
in meetings and workshops against those who considered it 
‘disloyal’ or ‘unpatriotic’. Although COSATU welcomed each 
judgment in TAC’s favour, it never openly supported the 
litigation.” (at page 300) 
223.   Together with the problem of  lack of  access to legal assistance, 
these tendencies may go some way to explaining the very 
limited litigation by poor communities against the government, 
particularly given that all three spheres of  government are in 
most areas ANC-controlled.  
224.   While the loyalty of  various communities to the ANC is 
unsurprising, it strongly supports the argument that at least 
some degree of  social mobilisation of  communities is essential 
before litigation can even be placed on the table as a viable 
option.
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STRATEGY 4 – LITIGATION
225.   The final of  our four proposed strategies is that of  litigation. 
While we have repeatedly stressed that successful litigation 
must not be seen as an end in itself, it can play a pivotal role 
when used in combination with the three strategies set out 
above. This position, in different guises, was supported by all 
respondents.  Properly used, public interest litigation enables 
poor or marginalised groups to achieve impact and success that 
would often not be available to them if  they were limited only to 
the three strategies set out above.  
226.   Recently, however, even this starting point has proved controversial 
in certain parts of  the world, particularly the United States.  In 
the 1990s, a furious academic debate took place over whether 
litigation could produce social change, sparked by Gerald 
Rosenberg’s work The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social 
Change? (1991).
227.   This is not the place for a detailed debate over the correctness 
of  Rosenberg’s views and, even more critically, the extent of  
their applicability in a South African context.
228.   Such a debate would be particularly unnecessary because, 
in truth, virtually no one has suggested that public interest 
litigation can never bring about social change.  Even Rosenberg 
himself, arguably the leading critic of  attempts to achieve social 
change via litigation, makes clear that his argument is far more 
limited than this:
  “Courts influence events all the time.  The claim The Hollow 
Hope makes is that only under certain specified conditions can 
courts further significant social reform.  Without the presence 
of those decisions, court influence will still be felt, but it won’t 
contribute very much to producing significant social reform.”
  Gerald Rosenberg, “Knowledge and Desire: Thinking about Courts 
and Social Change” in Schultz  (ed) Leveraging the Law: Using the 
Courts to Achieve Social Change (1998) at 255
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2007: Braamfontein, Johannesburg: the light towers of the Constitutional Court rise above 
the barbed wire  fortifi cations of Section Four, at the Johannesburg Fort, an apartheid-era jail 
where common-law and political prisoners were held. The court was built adjacent to the 
former prison to symbolise the triumph of democracy over apartheid and of a commitment to 
human rights over oppression
Pic: Gerald Kraak 
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229.   In the South African context, little point would be served in 
debating whether litigation only serves to influence social 
change, rather than produce or achieve it.  In any event, these 
are matters almost invariably incapable of  empirical proof.   The 
correct approach, we submit, is that of  Berger:
  “We will most likely never know with certainty the extent to 
which TAC was responsible for these momentous developments 
regarding HIV/AIDS treatment.  One can only reflect on the 
strong evidence that undoubtedly points in the direction of 
significant influence.  But even if one were to recognise the 
decision as a watershed, what is also clear is that – in and of itself 
– the judgment did not result directly in a sustainable policy 
shift.  While it certainly helped to strengthen the organisational 
profile of the TAC as a key role player of substance, it simply 
laid the foundation for further advocacy, campaign work, 
mobilisation and litigation” (emphasis added)
230.   Thus, the true debate is not over whether litigation can produce 
social change, but in conjunction with which other strategies 
and in what manner this is most likely to occur.
231.    We have already identified and addressed the three strategies 
that should optimally be used together with litigation in order to 
achieve social change:
 231.1    Conducting public information campaigns to 
achieve rights awareness;
 231.2    Providing advice and assistance outside of  litigation 
to assist persons in claiming their rights; and
 231.3    Making use of  social mobilisation and advocacy 
to ensure that communities are actively involved 
in asserting rights inside and outside the legal 
environment.
232.   What remains to be considered then is in what manner litigation 
is most likely to achieve social change. In particular, it is critical 
that the litigation be properly conceptualised, run and followed 
up.  
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233.   In this regard the evaluation has allowed us to identify seven 
factors that are essential to ensuring that public interest litigation 
succeeds and achieves maximum social impact.  These are:
 233.1   Proper organisations of  clients;
 233.2   Overall long-term strategy;
 233.3   Co-ordination and information sharing;
 233.4   Timing;
 233.5   Research;
 233.6   Characterisation; and
 233.7   Follow-up
234.   We deal with each of  these seven factors in Section 4 of  
this report. Suffice it to say, however, that unsurprisingly our 
assessment is that where public interest litigation takes place 
in combination with the three strategies set out above, these 
seven factors are far more likely to be present than where public 
interest litigation is seen as a strategy and end in itself. 
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2007: Action by civil society, including the use of litigation,  has seen essential services 
provided to the poor in informal settlements – here potable water is available to residents of 
the Grootboom informal settlement, near Cape Town 
Pic: supplied Legal Resources Centre
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Seven factors essential 
to ensuring that public 
interest litigation 
succeeds and achieves 
maximum social change
FACTOR 1 – PROPER ORGANISATIONS OF 
CLIENTS
235.   An important point that arises for consideration is which 
types of  clients lead to the most successful public interest 
litigation?  In our view, the ideal public interest client has two 
characteristics:
 235.1  First, generally speaking, public interest litigation is 
likely to achieve greater social change when the client 
is an organisation with a direct interest in the matters 
being litigated, rather than, for example, a few disparate 
individuals.
 235.2  Second, public interest litigation is likely to achieve 
greater social change when the client plays an active and 
engaged role – rather than allowing legal representatives 
to make key decisions without proper client input.
236.   With regard to the first issue, we have already touched on 
one example of  litigation that, while achieving impact for the 
individual concerned, has apparently not had any lasting social 
impact.  These are the women’s rights cases mentioned earlier 
– Carmichele v Minister of  Safety and Security and Another 
2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) and K v Minister of  Safety and Security 
2005 (6) SA 419 (CC).  
237   The difficulty, of  course, is that the individual litigant generally 
has an individual and narrow interest.  He or she (or they in the 
case of  a community) wishes to achieve an award of  damages 
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or avoid eviction, but there is often no greater cause at stake that 
is being asserted.  As a result the conceptualisation of  the case, 
the scope of  the legal debate and any remedy awarded tends 
to be narrow and individualistic, thus reducing the prospects of  
achieving social change.
238.   A good example of  this issue is the Grootboom case.  Until the 
LRC became involved in representing the amici, the case focussed 
exclusively on the position of  the Grootboom community and 
whether they should receive housing or shelter.  Had the LRC 
not intervened and, even if  the Grootboom community had 
succeeded, it is very likely that the result would have been a 
narrow judgment and order, focussing only on the community’s 
limited circumstances and affording them some narrow relief.  As 
a result, while they may have achieved success, the broad effect 
and prospects for social change would have been minimal.
239.   The LRC’s intervention shifted the focus from the narrow case 
to the broader cause.  It resulted in a judgment setting out 
principles and precedent far beyond the narrow circumstances 
of  the Grootboom community and gave a broad declaratory 
order declaring that the housing policy in the entire Western 
Cape Province failed to comply with the Constitution.  We deal 
with the effect of  declaratory orders below, but for present 
purposes it suffices to say that the Grootboom order, if  used 
properly by organisations such as the South African Human 
Rights Commission, could have provided an ideal springboard 
for achieving substantial social change.  This was only made 
possible by the LRC’s intervention broadening the focus of  the 
case.
240.   Even where an individual litigant seeks to bring a case with 
a broader goal in mind, the narrowness of  his or her direct 
interest can undermine these efforts. 
 240.1  This is because, faced with a settlement proposal that 
would resolve the immediate and individual concern, 
most clients (and their lawyers, who are ethically obliged 
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Above:
April 2000: A young illegal immigrant lies on a baggage rail while a policeman patrols in 
a crammed train compartment on the deportation train to Mozambique. Every Wednesday 
the Department of Home Affairs, together with the SAPS Border Police, repatriate scores of 
immigrants from Zimbabwe and Mozambique from the Lindela Detention Centre outside 
Johannesburg.  On this trip only 503 of the approximately 965 deportees arrived at their 
destination. The rest jumped out the train, allegely with police complicity. 
Below
2008: A Zimbabwean refugee makes it through the barbed wire fence which forms the border 
between South Africa and Zimbabwe
Pics: Nadine Hutton
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      to act in their interests) will have little option but to 
accept the settlement proposal, thus putting paid to 
the case and meaning the broader cause cannot be 
furthered.
 240.2      Indeed, this has become an almost inevitable tactic 
of  certain government departments.  Faced with the 
prospect of  an adverse judgment or order that may 
have negative implications, certain departments tend 
to litigate vigorously – taking every technical point 
imaginable – until shortly before the matter is to go 
to court.  Then, a few days before the court hearing or 
even on the day of  the hearing on the steps of  the court, 
a settlement offer is made to resolve the position of  
the individual litigants.  This offer, if  accepted, means 
that there is not even a precedent set because no 
judgment is issued, let alone a broad remedial order 
granted. This tactic is particularly frequently used by 
the Department of  Home Affairs in dealing with all 
refugee matters.
 240.3     However, where individual clients truly seek to act in 
the public interest as well, tactics can be devised to 
minimise this risk.  This is demonstrated by a recent 
refugee case Tafira v Ngozwane, run by the Wits Law 
Clinic, dealing with the unlawfulness of  procedures in 
place at Refugee Reception Offices. 
 240.3.1    In that case, the seven individual applicants – all 
of  whom were seeking refugee status – made clear 
that they acted in their own interest in reviewing and 
setting aside the unlawful decisions made in respect 
of  them, but also used South Africa’s broad standing 
provisions to act in the public interest in seeking wide-
ranging general relief  consisting of  declaratory and 
mandatory orders in order to resolve the systemic 
problems.  
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 240.3.2.    This meant that although the government conceded 
the individual relief  very early on, the case 
proceeded to obtain a full judgment in favour of  
the applicants, together with granting the general 
relief.
 240.4.    Such a tactic will not always be successful. 
Government departments often seek to settle 
the case as a whole by agreeing to the individual 
relief  only if  the general relief  is abandoned.  But 
nevertheless, this represents a valuable tactic to 
consider.
241.   A final point to be considered on the organisational nature of  
clients is that it is not always necessary that such organisations 
must represent all those affected. Coalitions of  different 
organisations can work just as well.  
 241.1    What is critical, however, is that the relevant 
organisation or organisations must be respected 
as legitimate and credible by as many people 
involved as possible.  Without this legitimacy, it is 
difficult for organisations to properly co-ordinate 
and plan litigation as there is always a risk of  other, 
potentially damaging, litigation being brought 
simultaneously on similar issues.  
 241.2    The National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality, 
discussed in Section 2, presents an excellent 
example of  this.  If  the Coalition hadn’t had the 
necessary legitimacy to persuade the foreign gay 
couple to allow the Coalition’s litigation strategy 
to run its course, that strategy could have been 
severely undermined.
242.   The second aspect of  client organisation is that public interest 
litigation generally works best and achieves maximum social 
impact when it involves clients who are well organised and 
able to provide proper instructions and direction to legal 
representatives, combined with proper follow-up after the 
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May 2008: NPOs protest against gender-related violence and child abuse outside Parliament 
and call for tougher implementation of legislation on children’s rights
Pic: Paul Hofman
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litigation. In other words, public interest litigation – like other 
forms of  litigation – should ideally be run by clients, not by 
lawyers.
243.   Regrettably, but unsurprisingly, this has generally not been the 
case.  As Berger explains:
  “By definition, claims for [socio-economic] benefits at state 
expense are the domain of the poor and the marginalised.  As 
such, it is not surprising that much of the litigation conducted 
on behalf of rights claimants is conducted with little of their 
input insofar as lawyering is concerned.  While a few notable 
exceptions – such as TAC – may exist, the bulk of cases analysed 
follow this trend to a greater or lesser extent.” 
244.   In addition to the exception of  the TAC cited by Berger, the 
National Coalition cases represent another important exception, 
albeit outside the socio-economic rights context.  In both the 
TAC and National Coalition, active organisations played a vital 
and central role in conceptualising, running and following up 
the litigation.
245.   The problem is that where litigation is run primarily by lawyers, 
it runs a substantially greater risk of  producing a case and 
judgment that is removed from the reality on the ground and 
does not achieve tangible social change.  Even with the best 
intentions in the world, lawyers generally see things from a legal 
perspective first, in contrast with clients who want to see an 
impact on their lives or those of  their constituencies.
246.   It is notable, for example, that for all the difficulties of  the 
Grootboom case, one of  the key factors that allowed the litigation 
to succeed as much as it did was the high degree of  organisation 
in the community.  Though the role played by the community 
appears to have reduced somewhat once litigation was under 
way – a regular difficulty – this community organisation was 
important in getting the litigation off  the ground.
247.   A similar example is provided by Berger in respect of  another 
case concerning poor persons seeking to obtain security of  
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  tenure – President of  the Republic of  South Africa and Another 
v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC).  As Berger 
explains:  
  “[This is] an interesting example of how a small firm – led by 
a larger-than-life, tenacious attorney – collaborated with the 
residents of the informal settlement: the disciplined Gabon 
community.  It confirms what many litigators understand – that 
large groups of people cannot be well represented unless they 
are well organised, able to take decisive action and resilient to 
undue pressure.  Making use of an outdoor ‘community office’ 
where meetings were held, the community took decisions 
on the basis of consensus-building and inclusivity.  For their 
part, the lawyers provided free legal services all the way to 
the Constitutional Court.  To date, they continue to assist as 
the community successfully asserts its claims to free basic 
municipal services.”
248.   In this regard, a key difficulty is relative lack of  appropriate 
organisations presently operating in South African civil society 
that can take on this role as active clients.  As one respondent 
put it:
  “The major obstacle post-2000 is the lack of mobilisation and 
organisation at the community level. It may sound alarmist, 
but at some levels it will be correct to talk of the collapse of 
civil society.”
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Current Chief Justice of South Africa, Pius Langa
Pic: Oscar Guiterrez
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FACTOR 2 – OVERALL LONG-TERM STRATEGY
249.   Where public interest litigation achieves maximum social 
impact, this is invariably not by virtue of  a single case.  Rather 
it tends to require a series of  cases, brought on different but 
related issues over a substantial period.  The earlier cases thus 
act as vital building blocks for the more complex and difficult 
later cases.
250.   We therefore conclude that it is critical that organisations 
seeking to utilise public interest litigation to achieve social 
impact do not attempt to rely on “one-shot” success.  Rather, 
they must develop a coherent long-term strategy that allows 
them to benefit from the substantial advantage that derives 
from being a “repeat player” in the courts. 
251.   The concepts of  “one shotters” and “repeat players” comes 
from a famous article of  Marc Galanter “Why the ‘Haves’ Come 
Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of  Legal Change” (1974) 
Law and Society Review 95.
 251.1    In this article, Galanter demonstrated the 
advantages which repeat players have in litigation 
over one shotters.  Parties that repeatedly litigate 
in the same area have the advantage that they 
develop specialised expertise, and enjoy economies 
of  scale and low start-up costs in litigation.  
 251.2    Moreover, and critically, repeat players need not 
seek to achieve their goals immediately in every 
piece of  litigation.  Rather they can develop long-
term litigation strategies, aimed at maximising 
the achievement of  their long-term goals in an 
incremental fashion.
252.   Though Galanter’s article was not focussing on public interest 
organisations, it applies with at least equal force to them. 
Indeed, his theories demonstrate precisely why, as Budlender 
puts it:
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  “Public interest law centres can often ‘punch above their 
weight’ - the impact of their work can be far beyond the size of 
the organisations.”
253.   The best example of  such a repeat-player in the South African 
public interest sector is the National Coalition.  As Section 2 
of  this report makes clear, the Coalition adopted a long-term 
incremental strategy which ultimately resulted in massive 
success – a string of  seven unanimous victories from the 
Constitutional Court. Though not all of  those cases were 
Coalition cases, it was the Coalition strategy of  easier cases 
first, more difficult cases later that allowed this to succeed.
254.   This should be contrasted with the effect of  a case like 
Soobramoney v Minister of  Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 
765 (CC).  
 254.1    That was the Constitutional Court’s first judgment 
on socio-economic rights – in which it refused 
an application brought by a severely ill man who 
needed renal dialysis treatment, but did not 
qualify in terms of  the criteria set out by the state. 
The problem was that these criteria were almost 
entirely beyond reproach and had been developed 
in order to deal with the limited availability of  
medical equipment and staff.  
 254.2    Though one cannot blame Mr Soobramoney – who 
died shortly after judgment was delivered – the 
fact of  the matter is that, as Berger explains, 
Soobramoney shows what can happen when the 
“wrong” cases are litigated. 
255.   The failure in Soobramoney not only appears to have discouraged 
socio-economic rights litigation, but also led to a perception 
that cases seeking actual medical treatment would not be able 
to succeed.  Though the losses in Soobramoney have been 
painstakingly clawed back via Grootboom, TAC and other High 
Court litigation, it is plain that by running the wrong case, the 
broader cause was undermined.  
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256.   A repeat player NGO, properly advised, would have made the 
agonising, but ultimately correct, decision that running the 
Soobramoney case would set back the cause of  achieving social 
change and should not occur.
FACTOR 3  –  CO-ORDINATION AND 
INFORMATION SHARING
257.   An interesting issue emerging from this evaluation is that, in 
virtually any given area of  public interest litigation, there are 
multiple organisations with similar aims all seeking to achieve 
success via litigation.  This is both unsurprising and desirable 
given that many organisations are operating in different parts of  
the country.
258.   Nevertheless, it raises the concern that if  there is insufficient 
co-ordination and information among these organisations, 
there is a real danger that resources will not be used effectively 
and, even more damaging, viable cases will be undermined by 
other conflicting cases being brought by other organisations 
simultaneously or beforehand.
259.   An example of  what can go wrong in this context is the case of  
Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC). 
 259.1    That case concerned the practice of  South African 
Airways’ refusal to employ HIV-positive persons as 
cabin attendants.  Hoffmann was a Legal Resources 
Centre case. 
 259.2    However, at around the same time, the AIDS Law 
Project was litigating precisely the same issue 
for another cabin attendant in A v South African 
Airways (Pty) Ltd.
 259.3    The difficulty was that although Hoffman was 
the case to first reach the Constitutional Court, 
it appeared to lack certain important medical 
evidence on the transmission, progression and 
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Former Chief Justice of South Africa, Arthur Chaskalson, who stepped down in 2005 and who 
presided over some of the Constitutional Court’s most path-breaking judgments
Pic: Helen MacDonald
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treatment of  HIV, as well as the ability of  people 
with HIV to be vaccinated against yellow fever, an 
important issue in the case.  In contrast, the case 
of  A v South African Airways  contained precisely 
such evidence.
 259.4    Ultimately, the difficulty was avoided when the 
Aids Law Project applied to be an amicus in the 
Hoffman case and successfully sought to place the 
relevant evidence before the Constitutional Court. 
Ultimately, the Constitutional Court ruled in favour 
of  Hoffmann, relying substantially on the evidence 
from the AIDS Law Project.
 259.5    The case thus ended in a victory for all concerned. 
However it demonstrates the danger of  insufficient 
co-ordination among public interest litigation 
organisations.  If  the AIDS Law Project had not 
intervened and if  the Constitutional Court had 
held that the absence of  the medical evidence 
meant that the discrimination against Hoffman 
was justified, this would have represented a major 
setback for organisations in this sector.  It could 
also have irreparably damaged the A v South 
African Airways case, even though the relevant 
evidence was available.
260   It is therefore crucial that there be proper information sharing 
and co-ordination among different organisations. This is 
particularly the case in an area like refugee law where there 
are a large number of  organisations undertaking litigation on 
similar issues throughout the country simultaneously. Such 
information sharing and co-ordination can take place via regular 
meetings, or alternatively even via a general internet site with 
frequent updating of  pending cases and useful materials.
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FACTOR 4 -  TIMING
261.   Timing is an essential element in any public interest litigation 
that is to have meaningful impact.  The litigation should not 
commence until and unless the climate is right and until the 
relevant evidence is in place.  The damaging effects of  running 
litigation too soon can be disastrous – particularly as an 
unsuccessful piece of  public interest litigation could, in practice, 
permanently foreclose the issue from being re-litigated.
262.   It is also very helpful to be able to demonstrate that court 
action has not been the first (or at least not the first and 
only) port of  call for the persons involved.  Where litigation is 
against government on controversial issues, courts will tend 
to be far more receptive and sympathetic where it can be 
demonstrated that the organisation has repeatedly sought to 
engage with government to achieve a solution but that this has 
not resulted.
263.   In this regard, TAC provides an ideal example of  launching 
litigation at the right time.  As Berger explains:
  “Timing played a crucial factor in TAC, which was launched only 
after a long four-year history of engagement on the specific 
issue.  In addition, it built on the organisation’s previous 
work to reduce ARV medicine prices, as well as scientific 
developments regarding the proven efficacy of a simple and 
affordable MTCT prevention intervention.  Equally important, 
the TAC did not act until it had given the state a reasonable 
opportunity to explain why – in the face of the available evidence 
– it continued to refuse to permit the use of ARV medicines for 
MTCT prevention outside of a limited number of ‘pilot’ sites, 
let alone to provide the medicines at state expense.  Simply 
put, litigation came onto the agenda when all other options 
had been exhausted.” (emphasis added)
264.   TAC demonstrates that public interest litigation cannot and 
should not be the starting point and exclusive strategy for an 
organisation wishing to achieve social change.  Rather, it should 
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be used carefully where a process of  social mobilisation has 
begun to take place and yet where attempts to achieve social 
change via the political route appear to have failed.
265.   This is in line with the approach of  the well-known American 
lawyer and law professor, Gary Bellow: 
  “The worst thing a lawyer can do is to take an issue that could 
be won by political organisation and win it in the courts.”
  Quoted in Heymann and Liebman, Social Responsibilities of Lawyers 
(1988)
266.   There are many reasons for this approach of  using litigation 
to achieve social change only when the political route has 
failed.  Prime among them is that this affords the organisation 
and cause two separate opportunities to achieve their goals. 
Provided there is real possibility of  progress on the political 
front, it would be highly risky to abandon this option and rely 
purely on litigation instead.  Not only might the litigation fail, 
but if  this took place, the chances of  reviving a political victory 
would be generally be substantially reduced.
267.   This is made clear by two current examples in the children’s 
rights sector:
 267.1    A group of  NGOs have been considering bringing 
a test case regarding corporal punishment in the 
home – the idea being to ask the court to strike 
down the defence of  reasonable chastisement. 
However, at the same time there has been 
lobbying of  government officials and members of  
parliament seeking to have a provision banning 
corporal punishment in the home included in 
the forthcoming Children’s Act.  If  such an effort 
succeeds, it will no longer be necessary to litigate. 
If  the clauses are rejected by Parliament, as now 
appears to be a possibility, then litigation can still 
be contemplated. 
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 267.2    A similar situation exists with regard to life 
imprisonment of  children.  While the Child Justice 
Bill proposed that life imprisonment be outlawed, 
the portfolio committee chairperson ordered that 
section be deleted. The bill is now in limbo. Child 
rights organisations are now waiting to see which 
direction the bill takes, but if  it fails to outlaw 
life imprisonment of  children, the litigation will 
proceed. 
268.   Other considerations favouring using the political route first 
include:
 268.1    The chances of  succeeding in the litigation are 
substantially increased if  government has had an 
opportunity to resolve the issue, but has failed to 
do so without justification;
 268.2    It conserves the limited political capital that courts 
have by only asking them to come into conflict with 
the government when absolutely necessary; and 
 268.3    It ensures that the primary focus of  the organisation 
– mobilising its members to achieve change – is 
not overrun by litigation becoming the primary 
issue.
269.   It should be noted, however, that deciding to bring litigation at 
the right time is often easier said than done.  The discussion 
of  TAC in Section 2 of  this report makes clear that at various 
points very difficult decisions had to be made.  Prime among 
these was the decision not to proceed with the litigation when 
the government appeared to be making some progress, and 
later the decision to follow counsel’s advice that the litigation 
would likely not succeed unless and until the Medicines Control 
Council registered Nevirapine for use to prevent MTCT.  These 
decisions were agonising given the lives at stake and provoked 
criticism from some of  the TAC’s allies.  Nevertheless, with 
hindsight, they were absolutely correct.
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2007: Cape Town city centre: child rights advocates, the NPO Molo Songololo, demonstrates in 
favour of further legal protections for children
Pic: supplied by Treatment Action Campaign
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FACTOR 5  – RESEARCH
270.  A critical, and often neglected, facet of  successful public 
interest litigation is the need for detailed research in advance 
of  and during the litigation.  We conclude that two different 
types of  such research are needed: legal research and factual 
research.
271.   The legal research is essential if  public interest litigation is to 
be given a proper theoretical foundation.  It involves a particular 
emphasis on making use of  foreign law and international law 
which is often not easily accessible, but which can play a pivotal 
role.
272.   The need for access to proper factual research is just as acute. 
Particularly in cases on socio-economic rights, many of  the 
factual issues will be highly specialised and complicated, 
involving statistical, medical, social science or other information. 
Those involved in running such litigation must have access to 
such research capabilities – either within their own organisation 
or via alliances with other organisations.  An excellent example 
of  this is again TAC where careful affidavits were procured from 
a range of  doctors and experts.
273.   At present in the South African public interest litigation 
environment, there appears to be a relative absence of  
appropriate organisations engaged in such research.  In this 
regard, one respondent stressed the need for funding of:
  “multidisciplinary and multiskilled organisations to have 
capacity to do socio-economic research as well as legal 
research and litigation”.
FACTOR 6 – CHARACTERISATION
274.   A substantial component of  any successful case is the 
“characterisation debate”. This is particularly the case given 
that a particular case – especially when in the public eye – might 
be viewed and perceived in multiple ways by courts and the 
public. 
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275.   A particularly good example is the case of  Minister of  Education, 
Western Cape, and Others v Governing Body, Mikro Primary 
School, and Another 2006 (1) SA 1 (SCA).  That case concerned 
the right of  an Afrikaans language school (with largely white 
pupils) to refuse to admit various English-speaking pupils (all 
of  whom were black).
276.   While the case could be seen as being about language rights (the 
issue the courts ultimately held as being implicated), there was 
a real risk of  the school’s approach being seen to be motivated 
by racism instead.  Thus, as Berger explains:
  “The importance of public opinion was well understood in 
Mikro.  Much time was spent by the litigants trying to win 
the media over, with a key spokesperson deliberately making 
himself available for more than just answering questions. 
This approach seems to have borne fruit – an initially hostile 
mainstream media warmed to the school’s position over time. 
This was crucial given the perception that the school’s conduct 
was racially motivated – a big and powerful white school 
refusing to admit small and weak black children.”
277.   It is thus extremely important for those involved in public interest 
litigation to demonstrate to both courts and the public that the 
issues at stake are critical, that the assertion of  fundamental 
rights is being used to redress unfairness and inequality rather 
than perpetuate it and that there are countless real people being 
affected on a daily basis. 
FACTOR 7 – FOLLOW-UP
278.   Perhaps the most critical factor of  all in ensuring that public 
interest litigation achieves maximum social change is the issue 
of  proper follow-up after the litigation.  
279.   Most critically, this involves ensuring that a victory in the litigation 
is put into effect by the relevant government departments, 
thus translating the legal success into practical benefits for a 
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large number of  people on the ground, including those who 
were not directly involved in the litigation at all. It also involves 
identifying the extent to which the litigation has had limited 
success and which issues therefore need to be focussed on in 
further litigation or advocacy campaigns.
280.   This need for proper follow-up is well explained by one 
respondent:
  “The ability of litigation to effect real social change depends 
in large part on the government’s willingness to respect and 
implement the court’s judgments. By raising awareness and 
mobilising the public around an issue, civil society groups can 
bring enough pressure on the government to compel it to make 
concrete changes.”
281.   The views of  this respondent, which were shared by many 
others, also make clear that in follow-up, as in litigation, it is the 
combination of  strategies that is likely to be most successful.  
 281.1    Trying to rectify the government’s noncompliance 
with a court order by using only “legal” mechanisms 
– contempt of  court proceedings, court inspections, 
more detailed orders – can succeed but faces 
significant difficulties.  Among these is the fact 
that many courts are (correctly) slow to use their 
limited political capital to threaten government 
officials with incarceration as well as obstacles 
arising from the State Liability Act 20 of  1957 
which limits actions that can be taken against 
the government.  Most of  all, however, there is a 
significant difficulty in getting any compliance out 
of  a government opponent that is recalcitrant and 
does not want to respond.
 281.2    In contrast, using public pressure and mobilisation 
– combined where necessary with further legal 
mechanisms – has a far higher likelihood of  
success because if  the pressure is effective, the 
government will have no option but to comply.
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282.   This is what occurred in the case of  N and Others v Government 
of  Republic of  South Africa and Others (No 1) 2006 (6) SA 543 
(D) and the sequels thereto.  In those cases, the applicants 
successfully obtained an order requiring the state to provide 
HIV/AIDS drugs for HIV-positive prisoners at the Westville Prison. 
Despite the government’s deeply hostile attitude on the issue, 
as Berger points out “persistent follow-up and skilful media 
and legal work has resulted in significant – albeit insufficient 
– compliance” with court orders. 
283.   The same is true of  pressure brought to bear on the state in the 
Mikro case concerning language rights in schools, to which we 
have already referred.  There, pressure placed on the government 
by the parents of  both sets of  learners resulted in compliance 
with the order granted.
284.   This can be contrasted with a range of  other cases in which 
effective follow-up was not present and as a result, substantial 
legal victories either produced no effect on the ground or took 
years to do so.  As already discussed in Section 2 of  this report, 
Grootboom is an example of  this much broader trend.
285.  The importance of  social mobilisation and advocacy in the 
follow-up process is particularly well illustrated by the response 
of  a respondent in the refugee sector:
  “In the use of litigation as a catalyst for social change, it is 
necessary to have strong representative organisations on the 
ground to ensure implementation of the gains made through 
litigation. 
  “However, [in the refugee sector, the] ability to ensure ongoing 
monitoring of the actions of the Department of Home Affairs 
has been circumscribed by the weakness of refugee and 
migrant organisations in the country.  
  “Refugee communities, in particular, often embody many of 
the divisions that led them to flee their countries in the first 
place.  Much of their time is also devoted to securing their own 
individual survival and access to documentation rather than 
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South Africa’s prisons are overcrowded, violent and unsanitary institutions, where all, but 
especially young offenders, are at risk of sexual violence and HIV infection.  NPOs working 
in the fi eld have brought a number of court actions against the Department of Correctional 
Services  to implement constitutional safeguards due to inmates under law
Pic: Nadine Hutton
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striving for the protection of the rights of asylum seekers and 
refugees as a group.  Moreover, asylum seekers and refugees 
are an extremely vulnerable group who often refrain from 
engaging in active advocacy activities for fear that this will 
affect decisions on their asylum claims or lead them to be 
arrested by law enforcement authorities.  
  “Thus, even [despite refugee information networks] in different 
information networks in Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban 
. . . the lack of strong refugee-run organisations limits the 
ability to ensure that the Department of Home Affairs and 
other law enforcement authorities actively implement court 
orders and decisions.”
286.   It should be noted that there are some cases which do not require 
follow-up, in other words obtaining the judgment has a sufficient 
effect on its own.  However, it would be a mistake in our view to 
conclude, as one respondent did, that civil and political cases 
generally require no follow-up whereas socio-economic rights 
cases do.
 286.1    This is demonstrated by the aftermath of  the 
Constitutional Court’s decision to invalidate the 
death penalty in S v Makwanyane and Another 
1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).  Virtually everyone took the 
view that the Constitutional Court order removing 
the death penalty from the statute books would 
be the end of  the matter. However, the process 
of  substituting sentences for those sentenced to 
death prior to 1995, where these sentences hadn’t 
been carried out, took inordinate time and effort. 
Indeed, it took three further judgments from 
the Constitutional Court (in Sibiya and Others v 
Director of  Public Prosecutions, Johannesburg, 
and Others 2005 (5) SA 315 (CC) and its sequels), 
a structural interdict and a ten-year delay before 
this occurred. 
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 286.2   Similarly in Nkuzi Development Association v 
Government of  the Republic of  South Africa and 
Another 2002 (2) SA 733 (LCC), a decision which 
upheld a right to legal representation in certain 
eviction cases, it was only after tenacious follow-
up and pressure on the government that the 
Department of  Land Affairs and Department of  
Justice began to implement the judgment.  
 286.3    Thus in cases involving classic civil and political 
rights – the death penalty and the right to legal 
representation – extensive follow-up was required 
for the judgments to be effective.
287.   A final issue on the question of  follow-up is the relationship 
between follow-up and the remedies issued by courts. 
Increasingly in the last few years – and substantially in response 
to the Constitutional Court’s refusal to grant more than a 
declaratory order in Grootboom – there has been a groundswell 
of  academic opinion and litigation efforts seeking to obtain 
more creative and/or intrusive orders from courts.  Generally 
the orders sought fall into two categories:
 287.1    Mandatory orders – directing the government to 
take certain defined steps, often within specified 
timeframes; and
 287.2    Supervisory orders – requiring the government to 
report back to litigants and/or the court as to the 
steps taken in fulfilment of  the order. 
 287.3    Often mandatory and supervisory orders have 
been sought in conjunction with one another.
288.   It is now beyond doubt that South African courts have the 
power to grant such orders, as the Constitutional Court made 
emphatically clear in TAC. Such orders have also now been 
granted in a number of  cases. It is equally clear to us that such 
orders can play a potentially valuable role in assisting litigants 
to enforce judgments.   
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September, 2006: Trustees of The Atlantic Philanthropies visit the Western Cape regional 
offi ces of the Treatment Action Campaign in Khayelitsha
Pic: Helen MacDonald
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289.   The question of  what order is appropriate for any specific 
case depends on the circumstances of  that case, including the 
attitude of  the government.  This is a point well made in K Roach 
& G Budlender “Mandatory Relief  and Supervisory Jurisdiction: 
When Is It Appropriate, Just and Equitable?” (2005) SALJ 325. 
Roach and Budlender seek to distinguish between three types 
of  government respondents – those that are “inattentive”, those 
that are “incompetent” and those that are “intransigent” – and 
set out their views on which remedies are appropriate in each 
case.
290.   However, a point made powerfully to us by one respondent 
was that while the use of  innovative and wide-ranging remedial 
powers by the courts is important in terms of  achieving social 
impact, it is arguably less important than the capacity and 
willingness of  the organisations involved to properly follow up 
and enforce whatever order is granted.
 290.1    Even an order that combines both mandatory 
and supervisory elements will likely achieve little 
in the way of  social change and will be rendered 
meaningless if  the organisations involved fail to 
properly follow up and enforce it, ideally via a 
combination of  legal and political pressure.
 290.2    By contrast, a declaratory order need not be seen 
as inherently ineffective. Properly used, it too 
can form the basis for a sustained and effective 
campaign of  legal and political follow-up.
291.   In this regard, declaratory orders appear to have been written 
off  by numerous organisations, including some respondents, 
substantially on the basis that the decision in Grootboom – 
which involved a declaratory order – has failed to produce any 
or adequate social change.  
 291.1    However, it appears that the blame in this regard 
cannot be laid exclusively at the door of  the 
declaratory order issued by the Constitutional 
Court.
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 291.2    Indeed, in paragraph 97 of  its judgment in 
Grootboom, the court emphasised the role of  
the Human Rights Commission in monitoring the 
government’s compliance with the judgment:
       “The Human Rights Commission is an amicus in 
this case.  Section 184 . . . of the Constitution 
places a duty on the Commission to ‘monitor and 
assess the observance of human rights in the 
Republic’ [and gives it] the power to investigate 
and to report on the observance of human rights 
[and] to take steps to secure appropriate redress 
where human rights have been violated. Counsel 
for the Commission indicated during the argument 
that the Commission had the duty and was 
prepared to monitor and report on the compliance 
by the state of its Section 26 obligations.  In the 
circumstances, the Commission will monitor and, 
if necessary, report in terms of these powers on 
the efforts made by the state to comply with its 
Section 26 obligations in accordance with this 
judgment.”
 291.3    Regrettably this came to naught. Though the 
Commission did issue some reports on the progress 
of  the government, it seems to have construed its 
role extremely narrowly – as focussing only on the 
Grootboom community and not the effects of  the 
order in general – and had little, if  any, effect on 
the government’s response to the judgment.  The 
Commission’s approach and the court’s refusal to 
give a more powerful supervisory remedy has been 
forcefully criticised.  
292.   There is no reason that a declaratory order granted by a court 
– provided that it is sufficiently specific as to the government’s 
obligations – cannot be properly enforced, followed up and used 
as a basis for social change.
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293.   Thus, while public interest litigants should continue to push 
for mandatory and supervisory orders in appropriate cases to 
assist in achieving tangible results, and while courts should be 
prepared to grant such orders in appropriate circumstances, 
the particular remedy granted can never become an excuse for 
a failure to engage in proper follow-up.
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Doors open on to the isolation cells at Section Four of the Johannesburg Fort – an apartheid-era 
prison where common law and political prisoners were held. Walter Sisulu, ANC 1963 treason 
trialist was held here,  as was Tsietsi Mashinini, leader of the 1976 Soweto Student uprising
Pic: Gerald Kraak  
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294.  Our key findings in this report may be divided into three parts.
295.   In Section 1 of  this report we identified the key challenges facing 
the public interest litigation environment in South Africa.
 295.1    We have concluded that the major challenge facing 
the public interest litigation environment in South 
Africa is a lack of  funding and resources.  This 
challenge is also substantially responsible for the 
second major challenge, that is the inability of  
public interest organisations to attract and retain 
sufficient numbers of  quality personnel.
 295.2    These challenges are matters of  significant 
concern.  As we have indicated, international 
research suggests that progressive constitutions 
and progressive judges – both of  which South 
Africa undoubtedly possesses – are insufficient 
to achieve substantial progress on human rights 
unless there are sufficient resources to sustain 
“support structures” – in the form of  rights-
advocacy organisations and rights-advocacy 
lawyers – for legal mobilisation.
 295.3    Given the massive inequality and poverty continuing 
to face South Africa, we are concerned that if  
organisations engaged in this work do not receive 
sufficient support, there is a danger that the gains 
of  the last few years will be undermined.
296.    In Section 3 of  this report, we identified four strategies that 
should be used in combination in order to achieve social 
change.
 296.1.    The first is public information.  Public information 
campaigns that inform ordinary people of  their 
rights are an essential component of  any effort to 
achieve social mobilisation on rights issues.   They 
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are critical if  people are to understand the role that 
law and legal rights can play in achieving social 
justice.  Moreover, without such campaigns, those 
conducting the public interest litigation are unlikely 
to be able to obtain the required information 
to launch the successful litigation, to generate 
substantial support from ordinary persons which 
plays an important role in perceptions of  the 
litigation by courts, the public and the government, 
or to transform any litigation victory into concrete 
progress on the ground.
 296.2    The second is advice and assistance in order to 
enable people to claim their rights.  It is essential 
that there are intermediary organisations which 
enable people to claim their rights, through 
giving advice, directing them to the appropriate 
institutions, assisting them with the formulation 
of  their claims, and taking matters up on their 
behalf  – all of  which can occur successfully 
without necessarily engaging in litigation.  This 
strategy too has substantial benefits for litigation, 
particularly because it provides an efficient means 
of  identifying the core issues that are affecting large 
numbers of  ordinary persons most seriously.  It 
thus allows public interest litigation to be designed 
effectively and targeted to achieve maximum 
impact, while also improving the prospects that 
a victory in a landmark case actually translates 
into tangible benefits for people far beyond those 
directly involved in the case. 
 296.3    The third is social mobilisation and advocacy.  It 
is clear from our evaluation that rights generally 
are most effective when they are linked to social 
movements.  Rights have to be asserted both 
outside and inside the courts.  Some form of  social 
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movement is necessary to identify issues, mobilise 
support around them, make use of  political 
pressure, engage in litigation where necessary, and 
monitor and enforce favourable laws and orders by 
the courts.
 296.4    The fourth is public interest litigation. While 
successful litigation must not be seen as an end in 
itself, it can play a pivotal role when combined with 
the three strategies set out above.   Properly used, 
it enables poor or marginalised groups to achieve 
impact and success that would not be available to 
them if  they were limited only to the strategies set 
out above.  
 296.5    We do not suggest that it is essential that a single 
organisation is itself  integrally involved in each 
of  these four strategies.  Indeed, often this is not 
possible and we readily accept that there is a vital 
role to be played by organisations consisting of  
litigation specialists.  However, it is critical that if  
such organisations do not themselves engage in 
the three other strategies mentioned, they must 
at least operate with other organisations that do 
engage in these other strategies.
297.   In Section 4 of  this report, we concluded that in order to achieve 
social change via litigation, it is critical that the litigation be 
properly conceptualised, run and followed up. In this regard 
we identified seven factors that are essential to ensuring that 
public interest litigation succeeds and achieves maximum social 
change.
 297.1    Proper organisations of clients. While public 
interest litigation can be run on behalf  of  a few 
disparate individual clients, we conclude that 
this is generally not an effective way of  achieving 
social impact.  Generally speaking, public interest 
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litigation is likely to achieve greater social change 
when the client is an organisation with a direct 
interest in the matters being litigated, rather than, 
for example, a few disparate individuals.  Moreover, 
public interest litigation is likely to achieve greater 
social change when the client plays an active 
and engaged role – rather than allowing legal 
representatives to make key decisions without 
proper client input.
 297.2    Overall long-term strategy. Where public interest 
litigation achieves maximum social impact, this is 
invariably not by virtue of  a single case.  Rather 
it tends to require a series of  cases, brought on 
different but related issues over a substantial 
period.  It is therefore critical that organisations 
seeking to utilise public interest litigation to 
achieve social impact do not attempt to rely on 
“one shot” success.  Rather, they must develop a 
coherent long-term strategy that allows them to 
benefit from the substantial advantage that derives 
from being a repeat player in the courts.  
 297.3    Co-ordination and information sharing. In virtually 
any given area of  public interest litigation, there 
are multiple organisations with similar aims, all 
seeking to achieve success via litigation. If  there is 
insufficient co-ordination and information sharing 
between these organisations, there is a real danger 
that resources will not be used effectively and, even 
more damagingly, viable cases will be undermined 
by other conflicting cases being brought by other 
organisations simultaneously or beforehand. 
Successful public interest litigation therefore 
requires co-ordination and information sharing 
among the organisations involved so that they can 
build on each other’s successes.
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 297.4    Timing. Timing is an essential element in any 
public interest litigation that is to have meaningful 
impact. The litigation should not commence 
until and unless the climate is right and until 
the relevant evidence is in place.  The effects of  
running litigation too soon can be disastrous 
– particularly as an unsuccessful piece of  public 
interest litigation could, in practice, permanently 
foreclose the issue from being re-litigated. It is also 
helpful to be able to demonstrate that court action 
has not been the first port of  call for the persons 
involved – courts will tend to be far more receptive 
and sympathetic where it can be demonstrated 
that the organisation has repeatedly sought to 
engage with the government to achieve a solution 
but that none has been achieved.
 297.5    Research. A critical, and often neglected, facet of  
successful public interest litigation is the need for 
detailed research in advance of, and during, the 
litigation.  Legal research, including using foreign 
law and international law, is essential if  public 
interest litigation is to be given a proper theoretical 
foundation.  The need for access to proper factual 
research, particularly in socio-economic rights 
cases, is just as acute.  Those involved in running 
such litigation must have access to such research 
capabilities – either within their own organisation 
or via alliances with other organisations.
 297.6    Characterisation. A substantial component of  any 
successful case is the “characterisation debate” 
– ensuring that the case is brought under the 
appropriate right and is correctly pitched to the 
court.  Any given case can be viewed and perceived 
in multiple ways by courts and the public.  It is 
thus critical for those involved in public interest 
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litigation to demonstrate that the issues at stake 
are critical, that the assertion of  fundamental 
rights is being used to redress unfairness and 
inequality rather than perpetuate it and that there 
are countless real people being affected on a daily 
basis. 
 297.7    Follow-up.  Perhaps the most critical factor of  all 
in ensuring that public interest litigation has the 
maximum social impact is the need for proper 
follow-up after the litigation.   This mainly involves 
ensuring that the victory in the litigation can 
be translated into practical benefits for a large 
number of  people on the ground, including those 
who were not directly involved in the litigation at 
all.  This is ideally done by a combination of  legal 
and political pressure. While the use of  innovative 
and wide-ranging remedial powers by the courts is 
important for achieving social impact, it is arguably 
less important than the capacity and willingness 
of  the organisations involved to properly follow up 
and enforce whatever order is granted.
298.   South Africa’s Constitution is one of  the most progressive in 
the world. It includes powerful and far-reaching provisions, 
including those related to socio-economic rights. Yet South 
Africa also continues to face massive inequality and poverty.  It 
is therefore essential that the Constitution is used in a manner 
that produces tangible and lasting social change.  As Dennis 
Davis points out:
   “A failure by successful litigants to benefit from constitutional 
litigation of this kind can only contribute to the long-term 
illegitimacy of the very constitutional enterprise with which 
South Africa engaged in 1994.  A right asserted successfully 
by litigants who then wait in vain for any tangible benefit to flow 
from the costly process of litigation, is rapidly transformed into 
an illusory right and hardly represents the kind of conclusion 
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designed to construct a practice of constitutional rights so 
essential to the long-term success of the constitutional 
project.”
  Dennis Davis, “Adjudicating the Socio-economic Rights in the South 
African Constitution: Towards ‘Deference Lite”’? (2006) 22 SAJHR 
301 at 314
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